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Abstract

A dataset of 854 small unmanned aerial system (SUAS) flight experiments from
2005-2009 is analyzed to determine significant factors that contribute to mishaps. The
data from 29 airframes of different designs and technology readiness levels were
aggregated. Twenty measured parameters from each flight experiment are investigated,
including wind speed, pilot experience, number of prior flights, pilot currency, etc.
Outcomes of failures (loss of flight data) and damage (injury to airframe) are classified
by logistic regression modeling and artificial neural network analysis.
From the analysis, it can be concluded that SUAS damage is a random event that
cannot be predicted with greater accuracy than guessing. Failures can be predicted with
greater accuracy (38.5% occurrence, model hit rate 69.6%). Five significant factors were
identified by both the neural networks and logistic regression.
SUAS prototypes risk failures at six times the odds of their commercially
manufactured counterparts. Likewise, manually controlled SUAS have twice the odds of
experiencing a failure as those autonomously controlled. Wind speeds, pilot experience,
and pilot currency were not found to be statistically significant to flight outcomes. The
implications of these results for decision makers, range safety officers and test engineers
are discussed.
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MODELING SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM MISHAPS USING LOGISTIC
REGRESSION AND ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

I. Introduction

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) are proliferating throughout the armed
forces, law enforcement and civilian sectors. There are tens of thousands of SUAS in
service around the world, comprising hundreds of unique airframes used for dozens of
diverse missions. Miniaturization, improvements in autopilot technology and the
development of advanced batteries have enabled SUAS to flourish where once only
larger Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) were feasible.
This explosion in the SUAS population has meant great gains for military units
who now can quickly employ a cheap reconnaissance platform without risking a pilot, or
an expensive aircraft. However, UAS in general, both large and small, tend to be much
less reliable than manned systems. The extent of current UAS analysis has been limited
to large systems, and the results of that analysis are not encouraging. Large UAS across
all platforms and services have historically seen mishap rates one to two orders of
magnitude higher than manned aircraft (OSD 2009).
Reliability is a critical issue for all UAS because “it underlies their affordability
(an acquisitions issue), their mission availability (an operations and logistics issue), and
their acceptance into civil airspace (a regulatory issue)” (OSD 2003). Given the dearth of
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data for SUAS, organizations like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are
hesitant to grant Certificates of Authorization (COAs) for SUAS flight in the National
Airspace (NAS). Research organizations like the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
must make important acquisition and flight testing decisions about this often
unpredictable technology, putting money and flight test safety at risk in the process.
Operational units purchase and fly SUAS platforms, putting their mission effectiveness
and troop safety in the hands of a technology with little published data. With data on
SUAS reliability, informed decisions could be made across the spectrum of SUAS
operations, from the regulatory side through development, test and evaluation, to
operational deployment of these systems. With an understanding of the unique nature of
SUAS and insight into the causes of their mishap rates, millions of dollars could
potentially be saved throughout the acquisitions lifecycle of this technology.
This thesis uses a dataset of SUAS flights from AFRL’s Munitions Directorate to
ascertain the root causes of SUAS mishaps to exploit them for process improvement and
lead to future mishap prevention. AFRL flies over two dozen types of SUAS with
wingspans from 20 inches to 11 feet and weights from one to 100 pounds. They use a
mixture of electric and gasoline propulsion. AFRL’s SUAS fleet represents a wide swath
of the sizes, payloads and propulsion types found in the general SUAS population. The
dataset that AFRL provided for this analysis is composed of five years’ worth of SUAS
experimental flight testing (from 2005-2009) with over 850 unique flights, 29 unique
airframes and 103 different tail numbers. The results of each flight were recorded in
flight reports and root causes were identified or hypothesized for all mishaps and aircraft
damage. In all, 19 unique parameters were extracted or derived from the flight reports,

2

including surface wind speed, ambient temperature, pilot’s previous number of flights,
days since airframe last flown, wingspan of airframe, and time of day flown.
This thesis utilizes multivariate data analysis techniques to attempt to classify
flights by mishap potential based on AFRL’s historical records and the parameters that
can be obtained prior to flight. Logistic regression is employed to develop classification
functions and to quantity the impact of key factors on mishaps. Artificial neural network
feature screening techniques are utilized to identify the most significant factors for
classifying SUAS mishaps so that they can be investigated for process improvement. The
root causes of SUAS mishaps are then exploited to create mishap prevention strategies.
Existing mishap prevention strategies for large UAS are considered and analyzed for their
potential applicability to SUAS in light of the mishap factors identified by this analysis.
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II. Literature Review

To date, there have been no published statistics on SUAS reliability, although in
the past 10 years, some reports on UAS reliability have been generated for larger
platforms. An explanation for this lack of detail in early research was offered by the FAA
in 2004: “[military UAS] are much less expensive than manned aircraft and so do not
warrant the same level of analysis” (Williams 2004). That may have been true in 2004
but today, when the military services are spending hundreds of millions of dollars
acquiring SUAS, the justification for further analysis is clear.

Mishap Reports
The primary mechanism by which to track large UAS reliability is via mishap
reports. Mishap reports document incidents in which an aircraft caused unintended
damage exceeding a certain dollar amount or injuries to friendly personnel or
noncombatants. As Nullmeyer, Herz and Montijo (2009) point out, “It is clear that
mishap frequencies, rates and causes are all dynamic in the emerging field of UAS
operations, and that mishap reports provide a fertile source of insight into where training
and operations need to be improved.”
Mishap classification in the Department of Defense is governed by DoD
Instruction 6055.07, “Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record
Keeping”. This document defines responsibilities and procedures for mishap
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investigations and provides the classification scheme to be used by the component
services. DoDI 6055.07 lists the following mishap classifications:
Class A mishap. The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other
property is $2 million or more, a DoD aircraft is destroyed (excluding UAS
Groups 1, 2, or 3), or an injury or occupational illness results in a fatality or
permanent total disability.
Class B mishap. The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other
property is $500,000 or more, but less than $2 million. An injury or occupational
illness results in permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are
hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for mishap reporting purposes only, does
not include just observation or diagnostic care) as a result of a single mishap.
Class C mishap. The resulting total cost of property damages to Government and
other property is $50,000 or more, but less than $500,000; or a nonfatal injury or
illness that results in 1 or more days away from work, not including the day of the
injury.
Class D mishap. The resulting total cost of property damage is $20,000 or more,
but less than $50,000; or a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as
a Class A, B, or C mishap.

Maintenance records and flight logs are not generally accessible for analysis, but
mishap statistics are collected and published by the different branches of the military. The
mishap reports generated from these events for large UAS have been collected and
analyzed by several scholars who sort and group the mishap causes into different
classifications.
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Mishap Factors
A consensus opinion to emerge from analysis of the data is that large UAS have a
much higher mishap rate than manned aircraft (Williams 2004). This has been attributed
to numerous factors. Human error was the most often cited cause. In early studies, it was
found to comprise anywhere from 21% to 80% of all mishaps (Williams 2004). More
recent studies have found that human error is a mishap cause in a range between 56-69%
of all mishaps (Tvaryanas and Thompson 2008). The other mishap factors are often
lumped under general categories, like “engine” or “structure” for those cases when a
cause has been determined at all.
The mishap factors varied in extent by aircraft. Given that the different branches
of the military fly differing UAS, the mishap rates varied by service. The difficulty in
comparing these human factors mishap rates across systems was summarized well by
Williams: “[M]ost of the other human factors-related accidents were unique in the sense
that a problem that occurred for one type of aircraft would never be seen for another
because the user interfaces for the aircraft are totally different” (Williams 2004).
The majority of research into the causes of these mishaps has focused on the
human factors involved. This is because engineering solutions are expected to progress as
they have for manned systems and gradually yield lower UAS mishap rates with system
maturation (Nullmeyer, Herz and Montijo 2009). Indeed, optimism has been expressed
that these engineering and automation improvements would lead to reduced human
factors errors as well: “The effect of human error is expected to decrease as the level of
autonomy increases and operators gain more experience” (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and
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Piegl 2008). These improvements are expected to occur over time, as they do for all new
technologies, therefore, the majority of literature on UAS mishaps has concentrated on
human factors, which is viewed as an area that can be immediately exploited for process
improvement.
An overlap between the human factors and technical causes of mishaps is that of
time, usually measured in number of flight hours. UAS safety performance is expected to
improve in most measures given more time to learn the intricacies of these complex
systems. Failure rates should be nonlinear and decreasing after “increased experience in
the operation of a given UAS type” (Clothier, et al. 2011). Additionally, OSD reports
that large UAS have seen improvements in mishap rates over recent years, with their
measured “reliability approaching an equivalent level of reliability to their manned
military counterparts” (OSD 2009). OSD expects, therefore, that large UAS mishap rates
will improve over time, specifically due to “flight experience” and “improved
technologies” (OSD 2009). Time is thus expected to correlate with increased human
performance and decreased technical risks.

Technical Risks and Reliability
Researchers have hypothesized other technical risks to manned and unmanned
aircraft operations that may not be time- or learning-curve-dependent, including
atmospheric conditions and maintenance reports. For UAS, NASA’s experience has
shown that “the most important operational consideration for flight has become the
weather” (Teets, et al. 1998). Specifically within weather considerations, NASA found
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wind speed and direction to be the most important meteorological consideration (Teets, et
al. 1998). While the above assertions are based on NASA’s experience, and support their
call for better atmospheric data characterization, no data were provided to quantify the
effect of climate on UAS performance. Quantifiable research by the US Air Force has
considered the effect of average surface temperature at a pilot’s home base as a potential
mishap factor for manned aircraft. The results revealed “no significant statistical
correlation between extreme surface temperatures at home station and the flight mishap
rates” (Miarecki and Constable, 2007). Likewise, Marine Corps monthly maintenance
reports were analyzed to determine if their contents could predict future AV-8 Harrier
mishaps, but no statistically significant model was found (Van Houten 1994). While these
two empirical results pertain to manned aircraft, each address important factors to
consider for SUAS, although no comparable studies for UAS of any size have been
found.
Some studies of SUAS reliability have considered Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Each involve engineering practices where
the system is defined as subsystems or components and their individual reliabilities are
analyzed to determine likelihood of faults and their resulting risk scenarios. Cline (2008)
attests that FTA and FMEA serve as useful tools for determining levels of SUAS
reliability and Dermentzoudis (2004) proposes a set of fault trees for a generic UAS. The
generality of those fault trees makes them adaptable to many potential UAS platforms,
but they require certain assumptions about the UAS (such as a gas-powered engine, two
wings, separate ailerons and elevators, the presence of rudders, etc.) that are not
applicable across UAS platforms. The FTA and FMEA analyses proposed for SUAS
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platforms are normative rather than descriptive and are decidedly nonspecific because
SUAS reliability data is not readily available for analysis (Dermentzoudis 2004).

Human Factors
The data available for large UAS mishaps tend to point to human factors as the
most prevalent mishap factor. Different conclusions as to the extent and categories of
human factors involved have been reached by researchers in part because there are a
number of different ways to analyze the data resulting from mishap investigations. Due to
the large number of classification schemes available, it is important to decide which one
to use to classify risk factors prior to initiating analysis (Ballesteros 2007).
The DoD has developed the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (DoD HFACS) to provide a common framework to classify and
analyze human factors for mishap investigation (DoD 2005). This framework creates a
taxonomy that is more descriptive than simply reporting “operator error” as a mishap
cause (DoD 2005). The taxonomy is derived from work by Reason (1990) and Wiegmann
and Shappell (2003) and is based on the concepts of active failures and latent
failures/conditions resulting from hazards present in four different levels of
responsibility. Mishaps are theorized to occur when hazards align across these four levels
(see Figure 1). That is, it takes failures from the organizational and supervisory levels to
permit the occurrence of preconditions for unsafe acts which ultimately result in active
failures (mishaps). The DoD HFACS classification system has been used to categorize
the human factors deemed responsible for large UAS mishaps. It relies on human

9

judgment to assign categories to the human error, so the conclusions resulting from
analysis of these categorizations have varied by investigator, platform, and timeframe.

Figure 1. DoD HFACS levels (DoD 2005), based on work by (Reason 1990)

The major result from DoD HFACS analysis of aviation mishaps has been to
identify Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Operational Risk Management (ORM)
as main contributing factors to manned aviation mishaps, and Perceptual Errors as the
main contributing human factor to Air Force UAS mishaps. An HFACS analysis of 124
Class A mishaps across manned aircraft revealed failures in CRM and ORM as common
mishap causes (Gibb 2006). This meant that errors in communication between
crewmembers, or failure to properly plan missions by ensuring aircrew proficiency, were
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most often contributory to these mishaps. Large UAS, while generally having similar
CRM and ORM considerations as manned aircraft, showed somewhat different results.
Perceptual errors, suggestive of poor situational awareness, exacerbated by the
peculiarities of UAS technology, were the leading cause of mishaps in US Air Force MQ1 Predator UAS (Tvaryanas and Thompson 2006). Another analysis of the MQ-1
Predator with updated mishap data concluded that both perception and skill-based errors
contributed the most to mishaps, but also shared similar latent failures (Tvaryanas and
Thompson 2008). This means that MQ-1 mishaps that resulted from skill-based errors or
perceptual factors had common antecedent hazards in the higher levels of the DoD
HFACS taxonomy.
In a broad survey of UAS mishaps across all military branches, no major,
common factors were isolated across the services (Tvaryanas, Thompson and Constable
2006). Instead, the Air Force tended to experience operator error from
instrumentation/sensory feedback systems, automation and channelized attention, the
Army saw latent organizational influences manifested as failures in guidance, training,
and overconfidence, while the Navy and Marines were impacted by more complex
factors closely associated with “workload and attention” and “risk management”
(Tvaryanas and Thompson 2008). The HFACS analysis indicates that the Air Force has
common failures in perceptual and sensory factors, possibly made worse by the
technology employed by their UAS platforms. The other services and manned aircraft
showed no common human factors. The commonality across Air Force mishaps gives
hope that these latent and active human factors errors can be exploited for mishap rate
improvement.
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One caution should be noted about using human factors classification for
mishaps; investigative biases may be present which are only reinforced by the labeling or
relabeling of error (Dekker 2003). Researchers report the existence of hindsight bias,
which is “the tendency for people with outcome knowledge to believe falsely that they
would have predicted the reported outcome of an event” (Hawkins and Hastie 1990). This
bias could impact the trustworthiness of mishap reports and the subsequent classifications
of human error, as investigators may find fault in areas that are obvious in hindsight, but
may not have been at the time of the mishap. This hindsight bias is “especially likely to
occur when the focal event has well-defined alternative outcomes (e.g. win-lose)”
(Hawkins and Hastie 1990), which makes it a potentially serious problem given the
“mishap”-“no mishap” outcomes that are investigated. Hindsight bias, coupled with the
practice of classifying error, “disembodies data…by excising performance fragments
away from their context” (Dekker 2003). One theory of error is that humans perform
erroneous actions which are viewed as rational from within their circumstances but which
are not rational when viewed from the outside or in hindsight. Under this theory of “local
rationality” any mishaps that occur are likely to reoccur as future individuals repeat the
same locally rational acts, while a classification scheme on these errors merely provides a
label to what in reality is a complex underlying problem (Dekker 2003). These
underlying weaknesses in mishap reporting and classification are duly noted, but must be
accepted in order to gain insights that can come from classification of SUAS mishaps,
because these insights could lead to the mitigation of SUAS operational risks.
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SUAS Risk Analysis
The risk scenarios commonly identified for UAS are mid-air collisions, ground
impacts, and loss of the UAS platform. Despite many years of FAA data and several
different models to predict the consequences of these risk scenarios, “there is currently no
consensus on the specification of airworthiness regulations for UAS” (Clothier, et al.
2011). The major risks and their anticipated impacts are discussed in detail below.
The single most significant hazard for a UAS platform is a mid-air collision. This
hazard is the primary one keeping civil UAS from being integrated into the NAS by the
FAA (Clothier, et al. 2011). Mid-air collisions are a threat to both manned and unmanned
aircraft operating in the vicinity of UAS. FAA reports through 2007 have only
documented “a small number of incidents” of mid-air collisions between civil aircraft and
remote control (R/C) airplanes, which all occurred between 1993 and 1998 and were
attributed to lack of situational awareness in the manned aircraft, or violations of airspace
rules and procedures by the remote pilots (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl 2008).
Despite the fact that no further data is available to quantify the consequences of mid-air
collisions, (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl 2008) believe that current regulations on
R/C aircraft (which are vehicles similar to the size and performance of the SUAS under
consideration in this thesis) are sufficient to ensure acceptable safety levels.
Ground impacts also pose a serious hazard for UAS operations. Several models
have been developed to better quantify the risks associated with an impact to individuals
and property. A blunt criterion estimation model for injury potential was developed for
SUAS which computes the likelihood of a fatality based on a direct chest impact
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(Magister 2010). When this model is applied to the airspeeds, frontal areas, and average
mass of the SUAS considered in this thesis, most are shown to be at low risk for a
fatality, even under the worst-case scenarios assumed by the model. A ground impact
analysis performed by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology suggested
that micro UAS (less than 2lb, less than 500ft altitude) posed a “relatively low risk” in
general and that mini UAS (2 to 30 lb at 100 to 10,000ft altitude) could be flown over
95% of the country with low reliability requirements (Weibel and Hansman 2005). While
the primary calculations of these models are in terms of fatalities, property on the ground
can be damaged as well and injuries can be sustained, but neither of these two outcomes
is taken as seriously as the potential for a fatality, and thus the numbers are not found in
these types of analysis.
The last major risk scenario is the loss of the SUAS itself. This poses costs to the
SUAS’s organization both monetarily and in terms of lost mission capability. The
minimum threshold for mishap reporting in the US Air Force is that of a Class C mishap,
which involves any damage over $50,000. Many SUAS, like the ones flown by
AFRL/RWWV, even if they were to be completely destroyed in a mishap, do not cost
enough to meet that minimum threshold. When UAS mishaps occur, even if only
resulting in minor damage to or loss of the UAS, they still have important policy and
mission impacts. Four documented Canadian UAS mishaps in Afghanistan, while only
damaging the aircraft themselves, nonetheless were said to have “created considerable
risks for units that must retrieve these vehicles” and to have “increase[d] the workload on
investigatory agencies” (Johnson 2008). Likewise, on the Eglin AFB range, there is a
common UAS test requirement to report all aircraft that fly out of control or that exit
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airspace boundaries. While any SUAS incidents that could meet these criteria may not
have caused any harm to persons or property on the ground, the incidents still require
reporting and possible investigation. The risk scenarios in SUAS operations are
considerable, but the likelihoods of these scenarios occurring have not been investigated
for SUAS.
Because little data exist on SUAS reliability, no empirical estimates are available
to establish the likelihood of the aforementioned risk scenarios. Since risk assessment is
comprised of a scenario, its likelihood of occurrence, and its consequence (Haimes 2009),
the overall risks of SUAS operations have not been well-quantified. For example, the
model for ground impact by Weibel and Hansman (2005) was used to calculate a
necessary mean time between failures (MTBF) to ensure reliable UAS operation for a
given population density, rather than computing actual reliability data from active
systems. The model by Magister (2010) assumes a chest impact and merely quantifies the
subsequent likelihood of a fatality, but does not seek to determine the probability of an
SUAS colliding with a person’s chest.

Overview of Mishap Prevention
The risks posed by UAS are deemed sufficient to warrant preventive actions.
Many programs aimed at mishap reduction have been implemented for large UAS
including: training, CRM, and medical screening. Additionally, research has examined
pilot qualifications and the background experience necessary to make better UAS pilots.
For the preventive actions that have had their effectiveness measured, the results are
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largely inconclusive, demonstrating that there may not be a clear extension from them to
prevent SUAS mishaps.
Many factors influence which prevention measures should be considered,
including the cost and effectiveness of the proposed measures. Although literature on
prevention is often found in a medical context, the basic principles of prevention are
applicable across disciplines. The statement: “Research needs to be conducted before
policies and programs are implemented when systematic reviews determine that scientific
information is scant and where gaps in knowledge about prevention exist,” (Jones,
Canham-Chervak and Sleet 2010) is as applicable to the medical field as it is to SUAS
risk management. The health framework for prevention concludes that priority in
preventive measures be allocated to those programs which have scientific evidence of
effective prevention, and especially those which can produce it at the lowest cost (Jones,
Canham-Chervak and Sleet 2010). This approach has been advocated in the aviation
community as well: “in order to make best use of available resources prevention
measures should focus on the areas with the greatest return…that are most manageable
and those where the precursors are more susceptible to an antidote” (Gibb 2006). A
survey of manned aircraft and large UAS preventive measures and their results may
provide insight to determine the priority that decision makers should consider for SUAS
mishap prevention.

16

Mishap Prevention Focused on Human Factors
One of the earliest manned aircraft mishap interventions was CRM, a training
program introduced in the 1970s to reduce errors by focusing on human factors causes
(Joint Aviation Authorities 2003). While CRM seems to produce positive responses in
trainees, the gains from the program on flight safety are inconclusive (Salas, et al. 2001).
Despite its lack of statistically significant success with manned aircraft, a CRM training
program has been proposed as a preventive measure for the Indian Air Force’s UAS
operators (Sharma and Chakravarti 2005). CRM training has been introduced for USAF
Predator operators (Nullmeyer, Herz and Montijo 2009), but the effects of that training
have not been quantified. The use of CRM as an effective prevention for manned and
unmanned aircraft mishaps remains to be seen, as insufficient data exist for analysis that
may support or refute its efficacy.
Some preventive measures for large UAS have focused on pilot qualifications and
screening. Given that human factors play a significant role in causing UAS mishaps,
studies have been undertaken to determine if proper pilot selection can prevent mishaps.
Schreiber, et al. (2002) found that on a high-fidelity Predator flight simulator, about 150200 hours of previous flight experience was required to match the performance of Air
Force pilots that are currently selected for Predator training. This means that an
individual with a civilian pilot’s license or one who had just completed T-38 training was
as skilled at the simulation as an operational pilot with no previous Predator experience,
implying that the skills needed for UAS operation may be enhanced with any prior flight
experience. The study’s authors are quick to note that experienced manned pilots who
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switch over to UAS may have to “unlearn” some skills they have learned in the cockpit as
the sensory environment is much different for UAS (Schreiber, et al. 2002). In a study by
Tvaryanas, Thompson and Constable (2006), which looked at multiple UAS platforms
across the services, the authors found that “experienced military pilot UAV operators
made as many bad decisions as enlisted UAV operators without prior military flight
training or experience” which suggests that limiting UAS pilots to rated officers may not
improve overall flight safety. Lastly, the FAA has proposed screening UAS pilots for
civil operations with a second-class medical certification in the hopes of reducing the
level of risk associated with pilot incapacitation (Williams 2007). This recommended
certification level is justified by noting that manned aircraft with similar missions that
operate in the proposed airspace have second-class certification requirements for their
pilots, although it is conceded that waivers are available for anyone who can demonstrate
safe aircraft operation (Williams 2007). Since these are proposed rules, no data exist to
quantify their effect on flight safety. Pilot screening and minimum qualification
requirements for UAS operations may only be beneficial when prior flight experience is
taken into account, regardless of rank or medical status.

Mishap Prevention Focused on Technical Factors
Technical preventive measures are introduced frequently in the UAS world: this
thesis itself is based on using data gathered while testing new technical innovations for
SUAS platforms. The technical risk factors for UAS mishaps previously discussed are
largely inconclusive and may not justify a technical intervention. While it is assumed that
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technological advances will proceed as the development of UAS platforms proceeds,
several authors caution that adding technology to already complex systems may degrade
performance. “There will be situations where the solution increases the complexity of the
system and, as a secondary effect, reduces the risk of one factor while increasing that of
another” (Ballesteros 2007). These effects are most pronounced in systems with
“interactive complexity” and “tight coupling”, which refers to systems like aircraft where
cause and effect are nonlinear with quick propagation of events through the system
(Perrow 1999). Fixes to these systems, “including safety devices, sometimes create new
accidents” (Perrow 1999). For that reason, technological fixes should be approached
cautiously lest their added complexity increase the risk of the type of accidents they seek
to prevent.
Several specific preventive technical measures have been proposed to increase the
reliability and safety of UAS operations, primarily automated landing capability and
sense-and-avoid. These two measures are proposed to allow UAS to perform at levels of
safety equivalent to manned aircraft. This is an important consideration for integrating
UAS in the NAS (Mejias, et al. 2009), and has potential to improve reliability figures for
UAS across all operational domains.
Automated landing capabilities are cited as having great potential to reduce UAS
mishaps. The RQ-7 Shadow UAS, flown by the Army, is equipped with a tactical
automated landing system (TALS) to eliminate external pilot landing errors. TALS is far
from perfect, causing 25% of Shadow mishaps as analyzed by (Williams 2004). This
system also requires operators to setup a landing site in advance with equipment
preplaced near the runway. In research conducted by (Mejias, et al. 2009), an automated
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landing system was proposed that allows logic onboard the UAS to select the optimal
landing site in an emergency situation, eliminating the need for ground crew and setup
time. Regarding increases in automation in general, (Williams 2004) states that “the use
of automation to overcome human frailties does not completely solve the problem, as the
automation itself can fail”. These automated landing approaches have promise for
reducing UAS mishaps, although affirmative results have not yet been obtained and their
added complexity may be problematic.
Sense and avoid (SAA) is a preventive measure that would allow UAS to detect
other airborne traffic and avoid a collision. This technology has been mandated by
regulations, particularly FAA Order 7610.4, which requires SAA systems to perform as
well as manned aircraft (Carney, Walker and Corke 2006). SAA would lower the
probability of the most severe risk scenario facing UAS (a mid-air collision), and is a
requirement before UAS can be integrated into the NAS. These systems have not yet
been implemented on UAS platforms despite some successful demonstrations, because
“testing without access to the NAS is problematic” (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl
2008).

AFRL’s SUAS Program Background
The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Munitions Directorate (AFRL/RW) has
been performing flight experiments on SUAS since at least 2005. The directorate uses
computer aided design and manufacturing techniques with rapid-prototyping equipment
to create and modify SUAS vehicles for a variety of missions. AFRL/RW has produced
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several vehicles of note, including the BATCAM and GENMAV. The Flight Vehicles
Integration Branch (AFRL/RWWV) not only designs aircraft but tailors existing
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) remote control aircraft for flight experiments.
AFRL/RWWV has a varied mission, both designing and flying experimental SUAS to
determine the feasibility of new technologies, and integrating customer payloads into
existing SUAS platforms to provide flight data.
The BATCAM (see Figure 2) is an example of an aircraft designed by AFRL/RW
to push the technological boundaries. The BATCAM was designed as a battlefield
surveillance platform for the USAF’s Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit. The vehicle
is a man-portable SUAS capable of being hand-launched by operators and was designed
to prove that compact surveillance vehicles were technologically feasible.

Figure 2. BATCAM SUAS developed by AFRL (Abate, Stewart and Babcock 2009)

The GENMAV (see Figure 3) is an aircraft designed by AFRL/RW as a
technology demonstration platform. The GENMAV was originally conceived as a
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baseline configuration for basic aerodynamic research. It has been used for that research,
but has also been modified to characterize flight maneuvers with flexible wings and has
been outfitted with different payloads for parachute recovery experimentation. These are
two of the over two-dozen SUAS flown by AFRL/RWWV since 2005.

Figure 3. GENMAV SUAS developed by AFRL (Abate, Stewart and Babcock 2009)

The aircraft flown by AFRL span a wide range of the SUAS category. They vary
in wingspan from 20 inches to 11 feet, with takeoff weights under 100 pounds. The larger
SUAS are gasoline powered while the smaller ones are battery-powered with electric
motors. Most are equipped with miniaturized autopilot technology to enable semiautonomous flight. The SUAS have three flight modes: autonomous flight with
waypoints preloaded into memory, semi-autonomous flight where the pilot provides
directional inputs while the autopilot maintains altitude and speed, and manual flight
where all commands are given by the pilot. Some aircraft are flown exclusively in
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autonomous mode, others are flown exclusively manually, and the rest are flown with a
mix of both depending on their missions and the goals of that particular flight
experiment.
AFRL/RWWV operates under AFRL Instructions for its flight test program. Two
primary documents govern its SUAS operations: AFRLI 61-103 “AFRL Research Test
Management” and AFRLMAN 99-103 “AFRL Flight Test and Evaluation”. The first
document outlines the general policy for testing in AFRL. It contains a risk assessment
matrix (see Figure 4) for test planning which allows program managers to determine the
level of risk each test poses which in turn determines the appropriate level of approval.
The dearth of SUAS data makes filling out this risk matrix highly subjective, as the
consequences are frequently unknown and their likelihoods have not been formally
quantified. AFRLI 61-103 defines a mishap as “unplanned events or range operations
resulting in loss/damage to DoD or private property, injury, departure from range
boundaries, or public endangerment”. The second document, AFRLMAN 99-103, defines
Class A through C mishaps much like the DoD classification, except that the dollar
figures are lower (AFRLMAN 99-103 is an older document). The AFRL manual notes
that Class D mishaps are not applicable to flight-related mishaps and adds a Class E
category:
Class E Events: These occurrences do not meet reportable mishap classification
criteria, but are deemed important to investigate/report for mishap prevention.
Class E reports provide an expeditious way to disseminate valuable mishap
prevention information.

23

Figure 4. Risk Assessment Matrix for AFRL Testing. Boxes 1 – 4 denote High Risk
tests, 5 – 9 are Medium Risk tests, and 10 – 20 are Low Risk tests (AFRLI 61-103)

Most of the aircraft flown by AFRL/RWWV do not meet the minimum cost levels
required for Class C mishap reporting. That is, if an SUAS were to crash and be
completely destroyed, it would not have caused enough damage (in dollars) to warrant a
Class C mishap investigation and report. Likewise, AFRL/RWWV’s SUAS fleet is
composed of mostly small vehicles that are highly unlikely to cause fatalities even under
worst-case scenarios. Therefore, the term “mishap” as defined by the DoD is not
applicable to the majority of AFRL’s SUAS. Instead, the term “failure” is used for the
remainder of this thesis. An SUAS failure is said to occur in AFRL/RWWV’s flight
experimentation program whenever required flight experiment data is not obtained due to
an SUAS or SUAS operator fault.
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Since the end product of the flight experiments are data, any SUAS action that
prevents the planned data from being collected is a failure. For example, if an SUAS fails
to cleanly launch and crashes on takeoff, that is deemed a failure, as the data from that
flight is lost. If an SUAS loses communication with the ground station and is forced to
land before all test points are completed, that, too is a failure, even though no damage
occurred to the platform. If an SUAS flies approach too steeply and breaks its landing
gear after all test points have been completed, that is not considered a failure, despite the
occurrence of damage. The term “failure” is an objective measure of the SUAS’s ability
to execute its mission for AFRL and is distinct from “damage”, which is quantified
monetarily to determine a mishap category.

Logistic Regression Modeling
Logistic regression is an analytical technique used to construct a model describing
the relationship between a dependent variable with a discrete response and one or more
explanatory variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Dichotomous responses (using “0”
or “1” to indicate the nonoccurrence or occurrence of some outcome, respectively, for
example) violate many of the assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
including homoscedasticity and normality of residuals (Menard 2002). Additionally, OLS
regression will produce a model whose range is – ∞ to +∞, which violates the 0 to 1

range for a binary discrete response. An example of a dichotomous response is shown in
Figure 5. An OLS regression on the data in this plot would be less than 0 for low values
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of the explanatory variable, and would exceed 1 for high values of the explanatory
variable.

1

Response

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

Explanatory Variable

Figure 5. Example plot of a dichotomous response.

Logistic regression addresses these issues by producing a model with a
continuous range from 0 to 1 that indicates the probability of membership in group 1
given the values of explanatory variables (Menard 2002). Logistic regression models also
have the interpretive benefit of fitting the rate of occurrence of the response variable.
Figure 6 is a logistic regression model fit to the data from Figure 5 when the explanatory
variable is divided into seven equally sized groups and the corresponding response rate is
modeled against their respective midpoints.
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Figure 6. Logistic regression model, fitted to rate data from Figure 5.

In general for a logistic regression model, let 𝑦 be the dependent variable and 𝑥⃗ be

the vector of explanatory variable values. The probability of interest is expressed as:
Pr{𝑦 = 1|𝑥⃗} = 𝜋(𝑥⃗).

The logistic distribution is used to model the probability. It takes the form:
𝜋(𝑥⃗) =

𝑒 𝑔(𝑥⃗)

1 + 𝑒 𝑔(𝑥⃗)

where 𝑔(𝑥⃗) is known as the logit transformation and can be expressed as:
𝜋(𝑥⃗)
𝑔(𝑥⃗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1 + ⋯ +𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝 = 𝑙𝑛 �
�.
1 − 𝜋(𝑥⃗)

The logit transformation is comparable to functions used in OLS regression
because 𝑔(𝑥⃗) is continuous with a range from – ∞ to +∞ and is linear in its parameters.

The logistic distribution is restricted to a 0 to 1 continuous range, it is a flexible function,
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and it lends itself well to interpretation(Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). The parameters of
the logistic function, 𝛽𝑖 , are usually estimated iteratively using maximum likelihood
methods and are important for the model’s interpretation.

are:

Given a probability of an event occurring, 𝜋(𝑥⃗), the odds of that event occurring
𝜋(𝑥⃗)
= 𝑒 𝑔(𝑥⃗) .
1 − 𝜋(𝑥⃗)

The exponentiation of any parameter 𝛽𝑖 represents a ratio of odds when the

explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖 is increased by one unit. To see this, consider two logistic

distributions, 𝜋1 (𝑥⃗) and 𝜋2 (𝑥⃗). Let 𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) and 𝑔2 (𝑥⃗) be the logit functions associated

with each of these distributions, respectively, where 𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) is identical to 𝑔2 (𝑥⃗) except
that variable 𝑥𝑖 has been increased by one unit:
and

𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 + 1) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝
𝑔2 (𝑥⃗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝 .

The odds ratio of these two logistic distributions becomes:
𝜋1 (𝑥⃗)
(𝑥
1 − 𝜋1 (𝑥⃗) 𝑒 𝑔1 ⃗)
= 𝑔 (𝑥⃗)
𝜋2 (𝑥⃗)
𝑒 2
1 − 𝜋2 (𝑥⃗)

=
=

𝑒 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝑥1+⋯+ 𝛽𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 +1)+⋯+𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
𝑒 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝑥1+⋯+ 𝛽𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 )+⋯+𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝

𝑒 𝛽0 𝑒 𝛽1𝑥1 … 𝑒 𝛽𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 +1) … 𝑒 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝
𝑒𝛽0 𝑒𝛽1 𝑥1 … 𝑒𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 … 𝑒 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝
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𝑒 𝛽𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 +1)
=
𝑒𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖
=

𝑒 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 +𝛽𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖

𝑒 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑒 𝛽𝑖
= 𝛽𝑥
𝑒 𝑖 𝑖
= 𝑒 𝛽𝑖 .

While a parameter in OLS regression reflects the change in the mean response
variable due to an increase in one unit of the explanatory variable, the parameters in
logistic regression represent the natural logarithm of the change to the odds ratio of the
response.
When building a logistic regression model, a stepwise strategy is often employed
with the maximum p-value of entry into the model, pE, set to a value between 0.15 and
0.20, although this may be relaxed to pE = 0.25 if the analyst desires to include a greater
number of potential explanatory variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). The minimum
p-value of removal from the model, pR, should be set slightly larger than pE, with typical
values being pE = 0.15 and pR = 0.20. Terms in the model are assumed linear in the logit,
an assumption tested using the Box-Tidwell transform, which tests for the significance of
the coefficient 𝛽𝑖 on the new term 𝑥𝑖 ln 𝑥𝑖 when it is added to the model. A significant

coefficient (usually at the 𝛼 = 0.05 level) means there is nonlinearity in the logit (Hosmer
and Lemeshow 1989). Likewise, interactions should be assessed among variables where
different response rates are expected at different levels.
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To assess the model’s classification accuracy a confusion matrix (also called a
classification table) can be used, which shows the counts of true positives, true negatives,
false positives, and false negatives obtained for a specified probability cutoff, usually
𝜋0 = 0.5. A more informative assessment is found by using a receiver operating

characteristic (ROC) curve (Agresti 2002). This curve plots the sensitivity of the model
as a function of (1- specificity) for the range of 𝜋0 . The higher the area under the curve,
the better the model is at classification, with 0.5 indicating that a model classifies no

better than random guessing (Agresti 2002).

Artificial Neural Networks
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is an information processing system that can
be used for classification or regression analysis (Steppe 1994) and (Bauer 2011). For
classification networks, an input vector’s information is extracted by the network and
processed in parallel by a number of “neurons” or nodes, which produce a classification
output. The input vector is a collection of the values of all independent variables (known
as “features” in the neural network) for a single instance. In the case of SUAS failure
data, an input vector would consist of the values of all the features deemed important to
the model for one flight. The model processes one input vector per flight and compares
its classification of “Mishap” or “No Mishap” to the known flight outcome, which is
supplied with the input vector.
A typical feedforward network takes the input vector’s values and processes them
forward through the “hidden layer” of nodes to the output layer, which yields a
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classification. It is called a “feedforward” network because the information travels
forward and is never fed back to any previous nodes. A simple feedforward artificial
neural network for classification with one hidden layer and two classifier nodes (which is
the neural network structure used herein for SUAS failure analysis) is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Feedforward Neural Network structure with one hidden layer and two output
nodes for classification. Based on a diagram from (Steppe 1994).

To process the data, each feature’s input value (the windspeed, number of total
flights, or days since pilot’s last flight, for example) is first normalized by subtracting that
feature’s mean and dividing by its standard deviation (Bauer 2011). This normalized
1
input is multiplied by a unique numerical weight (𝑤𝑖𝑗
in Figure 7) before it enters each

hidden layer node (𝑥𝑛1 in Figure 7). Within each node in the hidden layer, the weighted
inputs of all features are summed and then standardized to a 0 to 1 range using a

squashing function, such as the sigmoidal activation function (Steppe 1994). The sigmoid
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function takes an input and transforms it to a 0 to 1 range. For a given numerical input, 𝑥,
it takes the form:

1
.
1 + 𝑒 −𝑥

This is equivalent to the logistic distribution, only with x expressed as a negative
exponent in the denominator rather than as a positive exponent in both the numerator and
denominator:
1
𝑒𝑥
𝑒𝑥
𝑒𝑥
×
�
�
=
=
.
1 + 𝑒 −𝑥
𝑒𝑥
𝑒 𝑥 + 𝑒 −𝑥+𝑥 1 + 𝑒 𝑥

This function ensures that any numerical input is restricted to 0 to 1 output; hence it is
referred to as a “squashing” function.
After the weighted, summed values are squashed to the 0 to 1 range by the
sigmoid function, each hidden layer node’s output is then fed forward to be multiplied by
2
a numerical weight (with weights 𝑤𝑗𝑘
from Figure 7). All of these squashed, weighted

values from the hidden layer of nodes then become the inputs for the output layer of

nodes. The output nodes sum these inputs and squash them exactly as the hidden layer
nodes previously did. Each output node corresponds to a possible outcome. The node
with the highest output value gives the input vector its group classification. For the SUAS
data, the flight is classified in group 1 (“Mishap” or “Damage”) if output node 1 produces
a value larger than output node 0. If output node 0 produces the larger of the two values,
the flight is classified as group 0 (“No Mishap” or “No Damage”). To provide better
insight into the neural network process, the inner workings of a hidden layer node (𝑥21 )

are depicted in Figure 8. Some possible features (SUAS flight variables which have been
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normalized) are shown in the input layer for explanatory purposes, but do not necessarily
reflect the significant features of the final model.

Figure 8. A hidden layer node in a hypothetical feedforward network.

Artificial neural networks improve their performance by using learning
algorithms. These algorithms allow the neural network to adjust its weights according to
a known classification for the given input. The network is trained to minimize error
between its output and the truth data provided by the user. The learning algorithm used
here for the SUAS failure data is called backpropagation. This algorithm minimizes the
mean squared mapping error by updating both levels of weights after each input vector is
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fed through the network by performing a gradient search of the error surface (Bauer
2011). Essentially, the network compares its numerical output with the actual “0” or “1”
flight outcome. It then updates its weights to provide the most dramatic decrease in the
squared difference between the network’s output and the actual output. After the input
data associated with each flight is fed forward, the network “learns” the best adjustment
of its weights to provide more accurate results.
The network is “trained” with only a subset of the data (usually 60-70%) while
the remaining data are partitioned for validation and testing. Backpropagation is used to
adjust the network’s weights for the training subset of data only. The validation data are
fed forward through the network to determine their mapping error. In general, the
network is considered optimized when the validation data error is at a minimum. Since a
neural network with enough nodes can map an arbitrarily complex surface, the validation
data set is used to prevent overfitting. Overfitting occurs when the network learns the
training data so well that it no longer generalizes to other, similarly collected data (which
is what the validation data represents). Once the network is optimized, the test data is
used as an independent check of the overall classification accuracy of the network.
As with logistic regression, determining which input features are salient to the
model is important for parsimony and interpretation. Two primary saliency measures
have been proposed for neural network features: weight-based saliency measures and
derivative-based saliency measures (Bauer 2011). Weight-based measures take the sum
1
of the squares of the lower-level of weights (𝑤𝑖,𝑗
in Figure 7) for a given feature under

the assumption that the more salient features have weights significantly greater or less
than 0 whereas less salient features will tend to have weights of a smaller magnitude
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(Tarr 1991). Derivative-based saliency measures compute partial derivatives of the
network’s output with respect to feature inputs to determine a saliency measure (Bauer
2011). In both cases, the saliency of a candidate feature (considered for removal from the
model) can be compared to an injected noise feature, which is usually a uniform random
variate from 0 to 1 (Bauer 2011). If the candidate feature differs in a statistically
significant manner from the noise, it can be considered salient to the model.
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) saliency measure proposed by Bauer, Alsing and
Greene (2000) is used for SUAS failure modeling. This measure is weight-based and uses
the injected noise input as a comparison for all candidate features. The saliency measure
is computed by taking the ratio of the sum of squares of the weights for the candidate
feature i and the injected noise n and converting to a decibel scale (Bauer, Alsing and
Greene 2000):
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑖 = 10 log 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒10

1
∑𝐽𝑗=1�𝑤𝑖,𝑗
�

2

1
∑𝐽𝑗=1�𝑤𝑛,𝑗
�

2.

Neural networks are randomly initialized, a fact which can often produce different
results for the same inputs. To account for this randomness, the SNR saliency measure is
computed for each feature for some number of neural networks (usually between N = 10
and N = 30). The measure can be used to rank order the features, after which the least
significant feature (lowest ranked) is removed and the average classification accuracy of
the retrained networks is computed (Bauer, Alsing and Greene 2000). When there is a
significant drop-off in the classification accuracy after a feature is removed, the last
feature removed is retained in the network. When there is not a clear drop off, the analyst
or decision maker uses their discretion to determine the cut-off point at which the
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classification accuracy is acceptable. The remaining features are considered significant in
the model. As with logistic regression, confusion matrices and ROC curves are used to
assess the classification performance of the networks.

Summary of Literature Review
The risks to SUAS are numerous. Prior experience suggests that if SUAS are
comparable to their larger unmanned counterparts, they are at greatest risk of a failure
from human error. Factors expected to reduce this risk are pilot experience, pilot
currency, and any prior, manned flight experience. Since only one of AFRL/RWWV’s
SUAS pilots held an FAA-certified pilot’s license, and he flew for 8 flights (less than 1%
of total flights), only pilot experience and currency are investigated in this thesis.
Currency is measured as days since a pilot’s last flight.
The next most likely source of risk is weather. Temperature is not expected to
affect pilot performance, whereas wind speed has great potential to contribute to SUAS
failures. Both ambient temperature and surface wind speeds are investigated for their
contributions to SUAS failures, as well as experience at given flight locations, which may
exhibit unique local weather patterns.
The generic catchall factor of organizational experience suggests that failure rates
will decrease with greater experience. Total organizational number of flights are
investigated as a factor for its impact on failure rates. Additionally, the number of flights
on specific air frame types (“BATCAM” or “GENMAV”, for example) are investigated
to determine if failure rates decrease with specific platform experience. Number of flights
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on a given tail number (“BATCAM #12” or “GENMAV #3”, for example) are also
investigated to determine its relationship to failure rates.
Although not mentioned in any research above, interval values are investigated to
determine if the time between flights (for air frame, tail number, autopilot type, mission,
pilot and location) affects the failure rate. Lastly, since research indicated that different
types of aircraft experienced unique failure modes and rates, the data are analyzed while
controlling for type of SUAS, whether an AFRL-designed prototype, or a COTS air
frame. Likewise, the data are controlled for whether or not the SUAS was flown
manually or assisted by autopilot, as these different modes of flight are likely to affect
failure rates and types. These control factors are included when they are found to be
statistically significant to the model, and are disregarded if they are not.
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III. Methodology

Overview of Dataset and Modeling Approach
The dataset used for this thesis was derived from all available flight test reports (n
= 854) from AFRL/RWWV over the years 2005-2009. The dataset consists of 20
explanatory variables and three outcome variables whose values were extracted from the
text or context of the flight reports (see Table 1). Not every flight has complete data: for
example, some are missing wind speeds and temperatures while others (particularly those
not flown on the Eglin range) are missing flight failure or damage outcomes. Every flight
was entered into the database so that interval values could be determined (for example, if
there is no data for failure or damage for tail number 12 when it last flew, the number of
days between flights is still recorded on its next flight and its total number of flights is
incremented).
When dealing with missing data values, there are a few remedies that may be
adopted. If the data that are missing meet certain randomness and ignorability
assumptions, there are maximum likelihood estimation and imputation techniques that
can maximize the available data by replacing these missing values while minimizing any
bias introduced (Allison 2009). The technique adopted here is listwise deletion, in which
a flight is deleted from the model if it is missing a value in a variable considered
important to that model. This technique discards much data, but is “honest” in that it
usually results in large but accurate standard error estimates, which some other
techniques may artificially lower (Allison 2009).
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Table 1. Code listing for all variables.
n
Description
Min Max Mean
825
Days Since Air Frame Last Flew
0
911
8.28
766
Days Since Autopilot Type Last Flew
0
486
5.43
853
Days Since Last Flight
0
36
2.08
853
Days Since Last Mission
0
36
7.71
796
Days Since Location Last Used
0
729
8.37
787
Days Since Pilot Last Flew
0
484
7.22
668
Days Since Tail Number Last Flew
0
308
11.6
854
(0 = Autopilot, 1 = Manual)
0
1
0.0842
738
Maximum Forecast Wind (kts)
0
25
8.16
738
Minimum Forecast Wind (kts)
0
15
4.56
854
Number of Flights on Air Frame
1
251
59.2
772
Number of Flights on Autopilot Type
1
447
146
805
Number of Flights at Location
1
564
206
805
Number of Flights by Pilot
1
481
162
771
Number of Flights on Tail Number
1
42
10.2
854
Number of Flights Total
1
854
428
854
(0 = COTS Aircraft, 1 = Prototype)
0
1
0.712
751
Forecast Ambient Temperature (F)
25
95
71.9
Time of Day Mission Started
TIME
(ex: 0800 = 8.0, 1545 = 15.75)
704
4.5
22
9.96
738
WINDDIFF
(MAXWIND - MINWIND)
0
20
3.60
DAMAGE
(0 = No SUAS Damage, 1 = Damage) 751*
0
1
0.233
754**
FAILURE
(0 = No Failure, 1 = Failure)
0
1
0.385
(0 = Human Error, 1 = Mechanical
FAILURE3
Error, 2 = No Failure)
754**
0
2
1.42
* There are n = 542 flights with complete records and DAMAGE outcomes
**There are n = 540 flights with complete records and FAILURE outcomes

Code
DSAFLF
DSAPTLF
DSLF
DSLM
DSLOCLF
DSPLF
DSTNLF
MAN
MAXWIND
MINWIND
NFAF
NFAPT
NFLOC
NFP
NFTN
NFTOT
PROT
TEMP

A series of logistic regression models were constructed to assess the significance
of measured variables on different outcomes associated with SUAS failures. All models
were built with JMP 9.0 software using a forward stepwise algorithm with pE = 0.15 and
pR = 0.20.
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Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model
For the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model, the response variable under
consideration is FAILURE (0 = no failure, 1 = failure). The parameter estimates for the
resulting model (n = 672, with prior probabilities Pr{FAILURE = 0} = 0.64 and
Pr{FAILURE = 1} = 0.36) are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Parameter estimates and significance for the Logistic Regression Failure
Prediction Model
Term
Intercept
PROT
MAN
NFTOT
NFAF
NFTN
TEMP

Estimate
-2.67096
1.81659
0.74216
-0.00101
-0.00533
0.03781
0.01379

Lower
95%
-3.76805
1.29893
0.03315
-0.00187
-0.00854
0.01698
0.00084

Upper
95%
-1.57386
2.33425
1.45117
-0.00015
-0.00212
0.05863
0.02675

Std Error
0.55974
0.26411
0.36174
0.00044
0.00164
0.01063
0.00661

Chi
Square
6.181
47.309
4.209
5.297
10.597
12.661
4.353

Prob>
ChiSq
0.013
0.000
0.040
0.021
0.001
0.000
0.037

The corresponding odds ratios for a one unit increase in each explanatory variable are
given in Table 3.

Table 3. Odds ratios for a one-unit increase for variables in the Logistic Regression
Failure Prediction Model
Term
PROT
MAN
NFTOT
NFAF
NFTN
TEMP

Odds
Ratio
6.15083
2.10047
0.99899
0.99468
1.03853
1.01389

Lower
95%
3.66538
1.03370
0.99813
0.99150
1.01713
1.00084
40

Upper
95%
10.32161
4.26815
0.99985
0.99788
1.06039
1.02711

The model’s variables did not exhibit significant nonlinearity in the logit with
Box-Tidwell terms incorporated in the model, nor were any significant interactions
found. The ROC curve and confusion matrix are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10
respectively. The area under the curve (AUC) is 0.718, with a 69.6% hit rate for
classification.
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Figure 9. ROC Curve for Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model. AUC = 0.718.
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Figure 10. Confusion Matrix for Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model.
Hit Rate = 69.6%.

Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model
For the Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model, the response variable
under consideration is DAMAGE (0 = no SUAS damage, 1 = damage to SUAS). The
initial model (n = 678, with prior probabilities Pr{DAMAGE = 0} = 0.783 and
Pr{DAMAGE = 1} = 0.217) exhibited nonlinearity in the logit due to the NFTN variable.
The Box-Tidwell transform is left in the model to correct the nonlinearity. The parameter
estimates and significance are shown in Table 4. The corresponding odds ratios for a one
unit increase in each explanatory variable (except NFTN) are given in Table 5.

Table 4. Parameter estimates and significance for the Logistic Regression Damage
Prediction Model.
Term

Estimate

Intercept
PROT
NFAF
MAN
NFTN
NFTN*ln(NFTN)

-1.61308
1.42970
-0.00842
0.58012
-0.18407
0.05637

Lower
95%
-2.16840
0.90387
-0.01259
-0.13653
-0.35776
0.00902

Upper
95%
-1.05776
1.95553
-0.00425
1.29677
-0.01039
0.10372
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Std
Error
0.28333
0.26828
0.00213
0.36564
0.08862
0.02416

Chi
Square
4.60760
28.40087
15.66932
2.51739
4.31479
5.44358

Prob>
ChiSq
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.113
0.038
0.020

Table 5. Odds ratios for a one-unit increase for variables in the Logistic Regression
Damage Prediction Model.
Odds
Ratio
4.17746
0.99161
1.78625
-

Term
PROT
NFAF
MAN
NFTN
NFTN*ln(NFTN)

Lower
95%
2.46914
0.98749
0.87238
-

Upper
95%
7.06766
0.99576
3.65748
-

The odds ratio for NFTN cannot be directly obtained by exponentiating its
parameter because the Box-Tidwell transformed term, which is a function of NFTN,
affects the model’s predicted probability. The odds ratio for NFTN is not constant, but is
a function of its present value. The derivation of the odds ratio for a one-unit increases in
NFTN is shown below. In general, the odds ratio can be expressed as:
𝑂𝑅𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 =

=

𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 1)
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁

𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡+𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹+𝛽𝑀𝐴𝑁 𝑀𝐴𝑁+ 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡+𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹+𝛽𝑀𝐴𝑁 𝑀𝐴𝑁+ 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)
=

𝑒 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑒 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)

=
=

𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁) (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)

𝑒 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 𝑒 ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)

𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁) 𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁

𝑒 ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)

�𝑒 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 �(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 1)�𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)�(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁
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.

No significant interactions were found. The AUC is 0.681, with a 78.3% hit rate
for classification. The ROC curve and confusion matrix are shown in Figure 11 and
Figure 12 respectively.
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Figure 11. ROC Curve for Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model. AUC = 0.681.
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Figure 12. Confusion Matrix for Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model. Hit
Rate = 78.3%.
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Logistic Regression Human vs. Mechanical Error Model
The importance of human error as a failure cause was quantified by a model that
recoded the dichotomous dependent variable FAILURE into a polytomous variable,
FAILURE3, with three categories: 0 = Human Error-caused Failure, 1 = Mechanicalcaused Failure, and 2 = No Failure. Mechanical-caused failures encompassed events
where natural elements, autopilot errors, loss of communications, or electrical shorts led
to SUAS failures. Human Error-caused Failures included pilot error, ground control
operator error, or maintenance error which led to SUAS failures. Failures resulting from
design errors were included in the Human Error category, despite the fact that they often
produced effects that appeared to belong in the Mechanical-caused category.
A logistic regression model was constructed to classify each flight in the data set
into one of the three categories. The model (n = 651, with prior probabilities
Pr{FAILURE3 = 0} = 0.183, Pr{FAILURE3 = 1} = 0.184, and Pr{FAILURE3 = 2} =
0.633) has the parameter estimates shown in
Table 6.
The ROC curves for the model (see Figure 13) have AUC0 = 0.700, AUC1 =
0.750, and AUC2 = 0.730. The hit-rate on the confusion matrix (see Figure 14) is 64.8%.
Nonlinearity was found in the logit, which was corrected with the addition of a BoxTidwell term on (DSPLF + 1). The 1 was added to every instance of DSPLF since it often
has values of 0, which would otherwise send its natural logarithm to negative infinity. A
significant interaction was found between NFTOT and MAN, but the inclusion of this
term lowered the classification accuracy, so it was not retained in the model.
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Model for Mechanical Error

Model for Human Error

Table 6. Parameter estimates and significance for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model.
Term

Estimate

Intercept
PROT
NFTOT
MAN
MINWIND
NFTN
NFAF
DSPLF
TEMP
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1)
Intercept
PROT
NFTOT
MAN
MINWIND
NFTN
NFAF
DSPLF
TEMP
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1)

-4.68195
1.82054
0.00027
1.22563
0.08636
0.05039
-0.00602
0.08685
0.01697
-0.02314
-2.49574
1.83844
-0.00256
0.23041
-0.03502
0.02523
-0.00444
0.08163
0.00917
-0.01366
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Std
Error
0.77784
0.32554
0.00058
0.42476
0.02980
0.01390
0.00235
0.06932
0.00870
0.01829
0.76150
0.40826
0.00063
0.53824
0.03198
0.01365
0.00204
0.03075
0.00855
0.00574

Chi
Square
16.49
31.27
0.22
8.33
8.4
13.13
6.58
1.57
3.81
1.6
3.68
20.28
16.82
0.18
1.2
3.42
4.72
7.05
1.15
5.66

Prob>
ChiSq
0.000
0.000
0.638
0.004
0.004
0.000
0.010
0.210
0.051
0.206
0.055
0.000
0.000
0.669
0.274
0.065
0.030
0.008
0.284
0.017

Table 7. Odds Ratios for the Human vs. Mechanical Error model

Model for Mechanical Error

Model for Human Error

Term
PROT
NFTOT
MAN
MINWIND
NFTN
NFAF
DSPLF
TEMP
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1)
PROT
NFTOT
MAN
MINWIND
NFTN
NFAF
DSPLF
TEMP
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1)

Odds
Ratio
6.17522
1.00027
3.40630
1.09019
1.05168
0.99400
1.01712
6.28670
0.99744
1.25912
0.96558
1.02555
0.99557
1.00921
-
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Lower
95%
3.26246
0.99914
1.48157
1.02834
1.02341
0.98944
0.99993
2.82427
0.99622
0.43844
0.90691
0.99848
0.99160
0.99243
-

Upper
95%
11.68842
1.00140
7.83154
1.15576
1.08074
0.99858
1.03460
13.99401
0.99866
3.61597
1.02805
1.05334
0.99957
1.02626
-

FAILURE3

: Human
: Mech
: None

Actual

Figure 13. ROC Curve for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model.
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Figure 14. Confusion Matrix for Logistic Regression Human vs. Mechanical Error
Model. Hit Rate = 64.8%.

Artificial Neural Network Failure Prediction Model
For the ANN Failure Prediction Model, the response variable under consideration
is FAILURE (0 = no failure, 1 = failure). The ANN Failure Prediction Model is designed
primarily to screen out nonsalient features, and its input data (n = 539, with prior
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probabilities Pr{FAILURE = 0} = 0.62 and Pr{FAILURE = 1} = 0.38) are a subset of
the data used for the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction model. Since all variables are
included in the baseline model and refinements are made to the model by sequentially
removing variables, those variables with potentially problematic correlations were
removed prior to architecture selection and model building. The correlation matrix for the
input data was computed, resulting in the significant correlations shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Significant correlations for ANN input.
Factor 1
Factor 2
Correlation
NFTOT
NFAPT
0.833
DSTNLF
DSAFLF
0.702
MINWIND MAXWIND
0.689

For interpretation reasons, NFAPT was removed from consideration. It is easier to
track and interpret NFTOT than NFAPT. Likewise, MINWIND was removed from
consideration. Its value to a decision maker is less than that of MAXWIND, as most
regulations and safety requirements decree a maximum wind level at which an SUAS is
allowed to operate. DSTNLF and DSAFLF are not expected to be significant in the
model (based on the results of the logistic regression analysis) and are left in.
The input data was appended with a noise feature generated as a Uniform(0,1)
random variate. The data was then randomized and partitioned into training, validation
and test sets (70%, 15%, and 15%, respectively). Ninety feedforward ANNs with one
hidden layer, 100 epochs maximum, and backpropagation training were constructed in
MATLAB for each number of hidden layer nodes considered for the architecture. The
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average test set misclassification rate was plotted as a function of the number of hidden
nodes (see Figure 15) to determine a best network architecture. Based on the results of
this analysis, a network with 18 hidden nodes was selected, as this provides the minimum
number of nodes before the misclassification rate begins increasing.
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Figure 15. Test set misclassification rate as a function of number of hidden nodes for the
ANN Failure Prediction Model (95% confidence interval).

Features were removed sequentially according to the SNR saliency criteria. Fifty
feedforward neural networks each with one hidden layer and 18 nodes were trained to a
maximum of 100 epochs, with backpropagation. The SNR saliency of each feature was
computed after each network was trained and the least salient feature was denoted. The
feature that received the most “least salient” rankings out of the 50 runs was removed.
Features were removed in the order given in Table 9.

50

Table 9. Feature order of removal for the ANN Failure Prediction Model.
Total Number of
Features Removed
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Feature Selected
for Removal
DSLOCLF
DSPLF
DSAFLF
DSAPTLF
DSTNLF
TIME
DSLF
DSLM
TEMP
MAXWIND
MAN
NFTN
NFP
NFAF
NFTOT
NFLOC
PROT
NOISE

The test set misclassification rate was plotted against the number of removed
features for each of the 50 neural networks to determine the optimal number of features
to retain in the model (see Figure 16). The plot shows the misclassification rate
decreasing until 9 to 11 features are removed, after which the misclassification rate
dramatically increases.
The three models, for 9, 10, and 11 features removed were compared against one
another, with the noise variable removed from the input. One hundred neural network
models were created using the same settings as before. The results are shown in Table 10.
While a parsimonious model is desirable, so is an accurate model. The network that
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removed 10 features appears to perform best, with the lowest minimum, lowest average,
and only 7 features retained in the model. The variable MAN was retained in this model
(but would not be retained in “model 11”), which made it attractive because MAN was
declared earlier to be a potentially important control variable to include whenever
possible.
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Figure 16. Test set misclassification rate as a function of features removed for the ANN
Failure Prediction Model (95% confidence interval).

The architecture for the 7-feature model (containing features MAN, NFTN, NFP,
NFAF, NFTOT, NFLOC, and PROT) was constructed and 100 networks using this
structure were randomly initialized and simulated. From these resulting possibilities, the
network model with the lowest observed test set misclassification rate was selected. This
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model is the final ANN model selected for Failure Prediction. Its ROC curve and
confusion matrix are shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18, respectively. The AUC is 0.724,
with a 69.8% hit rate for classification.

Table 10. Comparison of three candidate ANN Failure Prediction models with 9,
10, and 11 features removed, results for 100 networks.
Features Removed
Average Test Set
Misclassification Rate
Upper 95% Rate
Lower 95% Rate
Minimum Rate
Maximum Rate

9

10

11

0.300
0.307
0.293
0.238
0.500

0.297
0.304
0.291
0.225
0.375

0.305
0.312
0.299
0.225
0.388
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Figure 17. ROC Curve for ANN Failure Prediction Model. AUC = 0.724.
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Figure 18. Confusion Matrix for ANN Failure Prediction Model. Hit Rate = 69.8%.

Artificial Neural Network Damage Prediction Model
For the ANN Damage Prediction Model, the response variable under
consideration is DAMAGE (0 = no SUAS damage, 1 = damage to SUAS). The input data
(n = 539, with prior probabilities Pr{DAMAGE = 0} = 0.803 and Pr{DAMAGE = 1} =
0.197) was preprocessed the same way as it was for the ANN Failure Prediction Model.
The architecture selection process was identically performed but was considerably more
difficult as there was no clear “best” choice from the plot of test set misclassification rate
versus number of hidden nodes (See Figure 19). The 20-hidden node structure was
selected, as it appeared to have a low average misclassification rate and would maintain
approximately the same structure as the previous model.
Features were removed sequentially according to the SNR saliency criteria. Fifty
feedforward neural networks each with one hidden layer and 20 nodes were trained in
MATLAB to a maximum of 100 epochs, with backpropagation. The SNR saliency of
each feature was computed after each network was trained and the least salient feature
was denoted. The feature that received the most “least salient” rankings out of the 50 runs
was removed. Features were removed in the order given in Table 11.
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Figure 19. Test set misclassification rate as a function of number of hidden nodes for the
ANN Damage Prediction Model (95% confidence interval).

The test set misclassification rate was plotted against the number of removed
features for each of the 50 neural networks to determine the optimal number of features
to retain in the model (see Figure 20). The plot shows the misclassification rate
fluctuating until 11 to 13 features are removed, after which the misclassification rate
dramatically increases, then decreases.
The three models, for 11, 12, and 13 features removed were compared against one
another, with the noise variable removed from the input. One hundred neural network
models were created using the same settings as before. The results are shown in Table 12.
While a parsimonious model is desirable, so is an accurate model. The network that
removed 12 features appears to perform best, with the lowest minimum rate, lowest
average rate, and only 5 features retained in the model.
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Table 11. Feature order of removal for the ANN Damage Prediction Model.
Total Number of
Features Removed
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Feature Selected
for Removal
DSPLF
DSAFLF
DSAPTLF
DSTNLF
DSLOCLF
TIME
DSLM
DSLF
TEMP
MAN
NFTN
MAXWIND
NFP
NFTOT
NFAF
NFLOC
PROT
NOISE

Table 12. Comparison of three candidate ANN Damage Prediction models with 11, 12,
and 13 features removed, results for 100 networks.
Features Removed
Average Test Set
Misclassification Rate
Upper 95% Rate
Lower 95% Rate
Minimum Rate
Maximum Rate

11

12

13

0.163
0.165
0.162
0.138
0.175

0.160
0.162
0.159
0.125
0.175

0.162
0.163
0.161
0.150
0.188

The 5-feature model (containing features NFP, NFTOT, NFAF, NFLOC, and
PROT) was simulated an additional 100 times at which point a model was selected with
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the lowest observed test set misclassification rate. This model is the final ANN model
selected for Damage Prediction. Its ROC curve and confusion matrix are shown in Figure
21 and Figure 22, respectively. The AUC is 0.742, with an 82.4% hit rate for
classification.
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Figure 20. Test set misclassification rate as a function of features removed for the ANN
Damage Prediction Model (95% confidence interval).
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Figure 21. ROC Curve for ANN Damage Prediction Model. AUC = 0.742
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Figure 22. Confusion Matrix for ANN Damage Prediction Model. Hit Rate = 82.4%.

Artificial Neural Network Human vs. Mechanical Error Model
The same coding system from the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model
was used to reclassify the dichotomous variable FAILURE into a polytomous variable,
FAILURE3 with classes: 0 = Human Error-caused Failure, 1 = Mechanical-caused
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Failure, and 2 = No Failure. Mechanical-caused failures included natural elements,
autopilot errors, loss of communications, or electrical shorts. Human Error-caused
Failures included pilot error, ground control operator error, design error or maintenance
error.
A neural network model was constructed to classify each flight in the data set into
one of the three categories. The model (n = 539, with prior probabilities Pr{FAILURE3 =
0} = 0.173, Pr{FAILURE3 = 1} = 0.204, and Pr{FAILURE3 = 2} = 0.623) was
constructed in the same way (and with the same parameters) as the previous two neural
network models. The architecture selection phase showed that 10 hidden layer nodes
were optimal (see Figure 23). The feature screening phase suggested a closer look at the
models with 10, 11 and 12 features screened (see Figure 24). The order of removed
features is given in Table 13.
The three models, for 10, 11, and 12 features removed were compared against one
another, after the noise variable had been removed from the input. One hundred neural
network models were created using the same settings as before. The results are shown in
Table 14. While a parsimonious model is desirable, so is an accurate model. The network
that removed 11 features appears to perform best, with the lowest minimum rate, lowest
average rate, and only 6 features retained in the model.
The 6-feature model (containing features NFTN, NFP, NFLOC, NFAF, NFTOT,
and PROT) was simulated an additional 100 times at which point a model was selected
with the lowest observed test set misclassification rate. This is the final ANN model
selected for Human vs. Mechanical Error Prediction. Its ROC curves and confusion
matrix are shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26, respectively. The ROC curves for the
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model have AUC0 = 0.698, AUC1 = 0.751, and AUC2 = 0.769, and the hit rate on the
confusion matrix is 67.2%.
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Figure 23. Test set misclassification rate as a function of number of hidden nodes for the
ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Model (95% confidence interval).
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Figure 24. Test set misclassification rate as a function of features removed for the ANN
Human vs. Mechanical Error Model (95% confidence interval).
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Table 13. Feature order of removal for the ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Model
Total Number of
Features Removed
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Feature Selected
for Removal
DSLOCLF
DSAPTLF
DSAFLF
DSTNLF
DSPLF
MAN
TIME
DSLM
MAXWIND
DSLF
TEMP
NFTN
NFP
NFLOC
NFAF
NFTOT
PROT
NOISE

Table 14. Comparison of three candidate ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Prediction
models with 10, 11, and 12 features removed, results for 100 networks.
Features Removed
Average Test Set
Misclassification Rate
Upper 95% Rate
Lower 95% Rate
Minimum Rate
Maximum Rate
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Figure 25. ROC Curve for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model.
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Figure 26. Confusion Matrix for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model. Hit Rate = 67.2%.
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IV. Results and Analysis

Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model
The Failure Prediction Model is comparatively simple to analyze because it has
neither interactions nor Box-Tidwell terms. The odds ratios are simply the exponentiation
of the estimated parameters. The largest odd ratio is for the variable PROT, which
indicates that, with all other model variables held constant, the choice to fly a prototype
SUAS over a COTS SUAS increases the odds of a failure by 6 times. Likewise, with all
model variables held constant, the same flight performed manually by a pilot has twice
the odds of a failure as does that same flight with an autopilot.
Interestingly, while the other four variables had low odds ratios (near 1.0) all were
significant at 𝛼 = 0.05. The one-unit increase may not the best metric for TEMP,

because temperature is usually estimated at 5-degree intervals on AFRL/RWWV’s flight
reports. The five-unit increase odds ratio becomes 𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃+5 = 𝑒 5∗0.01379 = 1.071,
which means that there is a 7% increase in the odds of a failure for every 5-degree
temperature rise.
Similarly, the odds ratio of NFTOT is better computed for values larger than 1,
since one flight out of the 854 total makes very little difference. In a similar computation
as was done for TEMP above, the odds ratios for NFTOT are shown for multiple
increments in Table 15. It shows that, with all other variables held constant, 10 flights of
additional organizational experience decreases the odds of a failure by 1%. An additional
500 flights decreases those odds to about 60%.
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Table 15. Odds ratio of NFTOT for multiple intervals
Additional
Total Flights
5
10
25
50
100
250
500

Odds Ratio
0.995
0.990
0.975
0.951
0.904
0.777
0.603

In the failure prediction model, the variables NFAF and NFTN worked in
opposition to one another. It was hypothesized that an increase in experience on a given
aircraft would lead to greater operator and maintainer competency which would
subsequently reduce failure rates. The model supports this hypothesis for airframes, but
not for specific tail numbers. The opposite signs on NFAF and NFTN mean that more
flights on an airframe (a given aircraft type, like the BATCAM or GENMAV) equate to
lower odds of a failure, but more flights on a tail number (a specific vehicle like
“BATCAM #12” or “GENMAV #3”, for example) equate to higher odds of failure. This
result is attributable to the fact that the vehicles are often flown to failure. While not all
vehicles crash (and failures do not require damage to have occurred) a given tail number
will fly until it is no longer needed for AFRL/RWWV’s research or until it has crashed
irreparably. In this dataset, a vehicle’s last flight is usually a failure, so it is unsurprising
that increases in NFTN positively correlate with failures. Additionally, there may be a
physical basis for this result, as older vehicles may be more prone to mechanical failure.
As with NFTOT above, increases in NFAF are given in more realistic intervals in Table
16. The results show that, all other values being equal, given the choice between two
airframes, one should select the airframe with more flights to reduce the likelihood of
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failure. An additional 10 flights lowers the odds of failure by about 5% and an additional
100 flights lowers the odds ratio to about 59%.

Table 16. Odds ratio of NFAF for multiple intervals
Additional Flights
on Airframe
5
10
25
50
100

Odds Ratio
0.974
0.948
0.875
0.766
0.587

The overall performance of the failure prediction model is acceptable, with an
AUC of 0.718 and a 69.6% hit rate for classification. Both measures indicate that the
model outperforms simple guessing, but not by much. A guess of “no failure” on every
flight would result in a hit rate of 64%, and is equivalent to the point in the upper right of
the ROC curve. By selecting a desired sensitivity, the corresponding specificity can be
obtained for the model. If AFRL/RWWV desired 80% sensitivity, the corresponding
specificity is about 50%. For 90% sensitivity, the specificity drops to about 37%.
Some sample calculations may serve to better illustrate the operation of this
model. Consider three hypothetical flights, whose data are shown in Table 17.

Table 17. Sample Calculation Data for Three Hypothetical Flights
Flight #
1
2
3

PROT MAN NFTOT NFAF NFTN TEMP
0
0
250
50
15
72
1
0
250
50
15
72
1
0
500
50
15
72
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Using the coefficient estimates from the model, we compute the logit for Flight #1as:
𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) = −2.67096 + 1.81659(0) + 0.74216(0) − 0.00101(250) − 0.00533(50)
+ 0.03781(15) + 0.01379(72)

𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) = −1.630.

The odds of a failure for Flight #1 becomes:

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1 = 𝑒 𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) = 𝑒 −1.630 = 0.1960.

Which makes the probability of a failure:
𝜋1 =

𝑒 𝑔1 (𝑥⃗)

1+

𝑒 𝑔1 (𝑥⃗)

=

0.1960
= 0.164.
1 + 0.1960

The model predicts a 16.4% probability of a failure given the Flight #1 values for
the independent variables. If the same flight on the same day were flown by a prototype
aircraft (PROT = 1, and assuming identical NFAF and NFTN) the data for Flight #2
would be used in the model. Following the same procedure shown above, the results
would be:
𝑔2 (𝑥⃗) = 0.1867,
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠2 = 1.205,
𝜋2 = 0.547.

The change from a COTS SUAS to a prototype SUAS increases the probability of
a failure from 16.4% to 54.7%. If the model were left in its default state with a
classification cutoff percentage of 50%, Flight #1 would be classified as a “No Failure”
outcome and Flight #2 would be classified as a “Failure”. Note that the ratio of the odds
for both flights is equivalent to the odds ratio for the variable PROT (the only variable
that was altered) from Table 3,

66

𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇 =

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠2
1.205
=
= 6.15.
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1 0.1960

Now consider Flight #3, which is identical to Flight #2 except that AFRL has now
completed 500 total flights. Perhaps Flight #2 was canceled and the hypothetical
prototype SUAS was placed on the shelf while 250 flights were accumulated, after which
the same flight test was attempted. The results from calculations on Flight #3 are as
follows:
𝑔3 (𝑥⃗) = −0.066,
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠3 = 0.936,
𝜋3 = 0.484.

Flight #3 has a 48.4% probability of a failure, which would be classified as “No
Failure”. The odds ratio between Flight #3 and Flight #2 is:
𝑂𝑅𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑇+250 =

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠3 0.936
=
= 0.777.
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠2 1.205

This is the same odds ratio that can be found in Table 15, which gave odds ratios for
increases in NFTOT. Since the only difference between Flight #3 and Flight #2 was the
250 flight increase in NFTOT, the odds ratios between these two flights matches the
value for 250 in the table.

Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model
The model’s significant terms and parameter estimates are comparable to those in
the Failure Prediction Model except that TEMP and NFTOT were not found to be
significant in the model when controlling for the other variables. The choice of a
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prototype or COTS SUAS only affects the odds ratio by a factor of 4 rather than 6, and
manual flight versus autopilot flight gives a multiple of 1.8 instead of 2. NFAF has the
same relationship with damage as it did with failures: greater airframe experience led to
lower odds on negative outcomes. See Table 18 for the odds ratio on NFAF at different
intervals. The nonlinearity in NFTN meant that the odds ratio of NFTN varied, crossing
above 1.0 at values over 10. Thus, NFTN behaved the same way as it did in the Failure
Prediction Model for values greater than or equal to 10; more flights on a given tail
number meant greater odds of a negative outcome. Interestingly, for less than 10 flights,
the effect of each subsequent flight, up to flight number 10, was to decrease the risk of
damage by lowering the odds ratio. Graphically, this is shown in Figure 27, where the
odds ratio for one-unit increases in NFTN are plotted against NFTN’s current value. An
odds ratio of 1 is dashed in for reference.
The Damage Prediction Model performed poorly overall. Although the AUC was
0.681, the classification hit rate was only 78.3%. This is the same as the percentage of
“no damage” outcomes in the dataset. Out of 678 flights, the model only predicted 8
“damage” flights, 4 of which were correctly classified. For 80% sensitivity, the model
produces about 43% specificity. For 90% sensitivity, 30% specificity can be obtained.

Table 18. Odds ratio of NFAF for multiple intervals
Additional Flights
on Airframe
5
10
25
50
100
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Odds Ratio
0.959
0.919
0.810
0.656
0.431

Figure 27. Odds Ratio for a one-unit increase in NFTN as a function of the present value
of NFTN. Plotted across the range of NFTN values.

Logistic Regression Human vs. Mechanical Error Model
The Human vs. Mechanical Error Model is comparatively difficult to analyze as it
not only contains a Box-Tidwell term, but it has a polytomous response variable with
three levels. The whole model has two submodels, the first of which classifies between
outcomes 0 (Human Error-caused Failure) and 2 (No Failure), and the second of which
classifies between outcomes 1 (Mechanical Error-caused Failure) and 2 (No Failure). The
classification function computes three probabilities, corresponding to outcomes 0, 1, and
2, the highest of which is selected as the estimated outcome.
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To compute these probabilities, let 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 = 𝑒 𝑔0 (𝑥⃗) be the odds associated with

the Human Error submodel for a given input vector, 𝑥⃗. Similarly, let 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1 = 𝑒 𝑔1 (𝑥⃗) be

the odds associated with the Mechanical Error submodel for the same input vector, 𝑥⃗. The
probabilities of each outcome are computed as:
𝜋0 =
𝜋1 =
𝜋2 =

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0
,
1 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1
,
1 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1

1
.
1 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1

The Human vs. Mechanical Error model shares some similarities with the Failure
Prediction Model. The parameter estimates for PROT compare well across both models,
and indicate that the odds of a failure increase by a factor of between 6.2 and 6.3 when a
prototype aircraft is selected over a COTS aircraft (holding all other variables constant).
Because a nearly identical odds ratio affects both Human Error and Mechanical failure
types nearly equally, this indicates that prototype aircraft are equally prone to mechanical
as well as human error faults.
The choice of autonomous vs. manual flight (indicated by a 0 or 1, respectively in
the MAN variable) was significant in the Human Error submodel (p-value = 0.0039) but
was insignificant in the Mechanical Error submodel (p-value = 0.6686). Since the
parameter estimate on MAN was 1.226 in the Human Error submodel, this meant that the
odds of a Human Error-caused Failure increased by a factor of 3.41 when the SUAS was
flown by a human rather than by the autopilot. Further, due to the insignificance of the
MAN term in the Mechanical Error submodel, one cannot say with 95% confidence that
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the choice between autonomous or manual flight affects the risk of a mechanical failure.
This result accords well with theory and common sense.
The variable MINWIND was significant in the model, but only in the Human
Error submodel. The model indicated than for every 1 knot increase in the minimum
measured wind speed, the odds of a Human Error-caused failure increased by a ratio of
1.09. A five-knot increase would result in an odds ratio of 1.54, with all other variables
held constant. Since MINWIND is not significant at 𝛼 = 0.05 on the Mechanical Error

submodel, one cannot determine its effect on Mechanical-caused failures. This result is

somewhat consistent with theory in that higher winds were expected to increase the risk
of failures. It makes sense that higher winds could lead to more human error failures,
especially in manual flight situations, but since environmental failures were lumped in
with the mechanical category, it is at odds with theory that wind speed should be a poor
predictor of mechanical failures as well.
The variables NFTN and NFAF worked as they did with the Failure Prediction
Model. An increase in flights on a tail number is associated with an increased odds ratio
of a failure. Meanwhile, an increase in flights on an airframe is associated with a
decreased risk of failure. This was true in general for both submodels, (noting that NFTN
was only significant to 𝛼 = 0.065 in the Mechanical Error submodel) and is a result of

the fact that individual tail numbers are usually flown to failure and then eliminated from
the flying population.
The variable DSPLF was significant in the model, and required a Box-Tidwell
transformation term to linearize the logit. It was not significant in the Human Error
submodel, but was very significant (both p-values < 0.02) to the Mechanical Error
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submodel. This meant that while the pilot’s currency (the number of days since the pilot
had last flown) was important for classifying mishaps, it only impacted the classification
when mechanical errors caused failures, and was not significant for human error failures.
Since the model has two terms with DSPLF, it has a variable odds ratio dependent upon
its current value, much like NFTN did in the Damage Prediction Model. The one-unit
odds ratio has been computed for the Mechanical Error submodel, the only model for
which DSPLF was significant and is shown in Figure 28. It shows that the odds ratio of a
mechanical-caused failure is above 1 for low values of DSPLF, but decreases with
successively larger values. This means that the more days a pilot has between flights (up
to his 143rd day, which is the crossover with odds ratio = 1) the higher the risk of a
mechanical-caused failure. Each missed day increases the risk of failure, but has less
effect each successive day, until the 143rd day, after which each successive missed day
lowers the risk of a mechanical failure.
The model is a poor classifier. While two of the three ROC curves are better than
the Failure Prediction Model and all three are better than the Damage Prediction Model
(measured by AUC), the overall classification accuracy from the Confusion Matrix shows
a model just barely better than guessing. With 63.3% of flights ending in no mishap, the
model was only able to correctly classify 64.8% of flights. The model only predicted 78
failures (when 239 had occurred) and, of those predicted, only 37 were correctly
classified while 14 were classified as the wrong kind of failure. From the ROC curve, it
can be seen that to achieve 80% sensitivity, only 42% specificity (for the lowest curve) is
achieved. For 90% sensitivity, the model yields only 28% specificity.
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Some sample calculations may serve to better illustrate the operation of this
model. Consider three hypothetical flights, whose data are shown in Table 19. These are
similar to the hypothetical flights from Table 17, except that the mean values of
MINWIND and DSPLF are included in the independent variables, and the MAN variable
is changed for the third flight rather than NFTOT.

1.08

Odds Ratio

1.06

1.04

1.02

1

0.98
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
DSPLF

Figure 28. Odds Ratio for a one-unit increase in DSPLF as a function of the present
value of DSPLF. Plotted for the 1 vs. 2 (Mechanical Error) Model for a three-week range.

Table 19. Sample Calculation Data for Three Hypothetical Flights
Flight #
1
2
3

PROT
0
1
1

NFTOT
250
250
250

MAN
0
0
1

MINWIND
5
5
5
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NFTN
15
15
15

NFAF DSPLF
7
50
7
50
7
50

TEMP
72
72
72

Using the coefficient estimates from the model, we compute the logit in the
Human Error submodel for Flight #1 as:
𝑔01 (𝑥⃗) = −4.68195 + 1.82054(0) + 0.00027(250) + 1.22563(0) + 0.08636(5)
+ 0.05039(15) − 0.00602(50) + 0.08685(7) + 0.01697(72)
− 0.02314(7 + 1)ln(7 + 1)

𝑔01 (𝑥⃗) = −2.282.

The same is computed for the Mechanical Error submodel, yielding:
𝑔11 (𝑥⃗) = −2.151.

The odds of a Human Error-caused failure for Flight #1 becomes:
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠01 = 𝑒 𝑔01 (𝑥⃗) = 𝑒 −2.282 = 0.102.

The odds of a Mechanical Error-caused failure for Flight #1 becomes:
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠11 = 𝑒 𝑔11 (𝑥⃗) = 𝑒 −2.151 = 0.116.

Which makes the probability of a Human Error-caused failure:
𝜋01 =

𝑒 𝑔01 (𝑥⃗)

1 + 𝑒 𝑔01(𝑥⃗) + 𝑒 𝑔11 (𝑥⃗)

=

0.102
= 0.084.
1 + 0.102 + 0.116

=

0.116
= 0.095.
1 + 0.102 + 0.116

=

1
= 0.821.
1 + 0.102 + 0.116

For Mechanical Error-caused failures, the probability is:
𝜋11 =

𝑒 𝑔11 (𝑥⃗)

1 + 𝑒 𝑔01 (𝑥⃗) + 𝑒 𝑔11 (𝑥⃗)

For the “No Failure” outcome, the probability is:
𝜋21 =

1+

1

𝑒 𝑔01(𝑥⃗)

+

𝑒 𝑔11 (𝑥⃗)

The model selects the outcome with the highest probability (𝜋21 = 82.1%), and

would classify this as a “No Failure” flight. If the same flight were flown by a prototype
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SUAS instead of a COTS SUAS (as in Flight #2 from Table 19, assuming the same pilot
and identical NFTN and NFAF on the aircraft), the results change as follows:
𝑔02 (𝑥⃗) = −0.462,
𝑔12 (𝑥⃗) = −0.313,
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠02 = 0.630,

𝜋02 =
𝜋12 =
𝜋22 =

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠12 = 0.731,

0.630
= 0.267,
1 + 0.630 + 0.731

0.731
= 0.310,
1 + 0.630 + 0.731

1
= 0.423.
1 + 0.630 + 0.731

The classification remains the same, “No Failure”, with 𝜋21 = 42.3% as the

highest of the three probabilities. If the same flight test with the same prototype aircraft
was performed with a pilot flying manually rather than by autopilot (Flight #3 from Table
19, where MAN = 1) the model calculations produce the following results:
𝑔03 (𝑥⃗) = 0.764,

𝑔13 (𝑥⃗) = −0.082,
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠03 = 2.147,

𝜋03 =
𝜋13 =
𝜋23 =

𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠13 = 0.921,

2.147
= 0.528,
1 + 2.147 + 0.921

0.921
= 0.226,
1 + 2.147 + 0.921

1
= 0.246.
1 + 2.147 + 0.921
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The classification category changes for Flight #3. Rather than “No Failure” like
the previous two flights, the model selects “Human Error” as the most likely outcome for
the flight. This accords with the interpretation of the coefficients and odds ratios provided
above which indicated that prototype aircraft increase the risk of both types of failures,
and that manual flight increases the risk of Human Error-caused failures. In the example
case, the change to manual flight had a significant impact on the odds ratio to indicate a
Human Error outcome. The change to manual flight will always have that impact on the
odds ratios, but those odds ratios affect the classification outcomes differently, depending
on the starting probabilities.

Artificial Neural Network Models
The ANN models were used to screen features to determine which factors had the
greatest impact on each of the SUAS outcomes. The three ANN models showed many
similarities with each other and had much in common with the logistic regression models,
but the differences between them can also be exploited to gain insight into SUAS failures
and damage.
The worst-performing ANN model was the model for Damage Prediction, which
matches the results for logistic regression. The way the neural network model was formed
gives additional insight into why both Damage models are barely better than guessing.
When exploring a neural network’s potential architecture, one should see a decreasing
misclassification rate as more nodes are added until the rate stabilizes, and any additional
nodes fail to provide improved performance. This behavior is clearly seen in the ANN
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Failure Prediction Model (see Figure 15). The ANN Damage Model (see Figure 19) does
not display this behavior. This means that there is no optimal, minimal architecture,
which is probably a result of having data that is indistinguishable from noise. This can be
seen in the plot of misclassification rate as a function of features removed, which should
look like a mirror image of the architecture exploration plot. The ANN Damage
Prediction Model (see Figure 20) has a fluctuating mishap classification rate, which
spikes when most features are removed and then rapidly decreases. Since the last data
point shows the misclassification rate when a noise variable is the only input to the
model, it suggests that the other data add little to the classification, because including
them results in a higher misclassification rate. Thus, both Damage Prediction Models are
difficult to correctly classify based on the noise-like quality of their input data, relative to
the output.
The ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Model is better by comparison, exhibiting
misclassification rate curves that are more typical of well-classifying neural networks.
The model performed almost identically to the Logistic Regression Model, with ROC
AUCs that nearly matched for both Human and Mechanical Error. This was an
encouraging result and suggested that prediction of the specific types of error is possible.
The confusion matrix clarifies that when Mechanical Error is predicted, the model only
32

classifies it correctly 13+20+32 = 49.2% of the time. Interestingly, if the Human and

Mechanical Error classifications are lumped together, this model has a higher hit rate than
the Failure Prediction model, correctly predicting
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22+13+10+32+308
539

= 71.4% of total

mishaps, regardless of cause. This outperforms the ANN Failure Prediction model, which
only had a hit rate of 69.8%.
The ANN Failure Prediction Model was the best-looking model from an
architecture selection and feature-screening perspective. It displayed the expected
characteristics of a good classifying network. Its performance was very similar to that of
the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model, with a nearly identical ROC curve and
confusion matrix (when taking into account the different sample sizes). The features
selected for the model compare favorably with those found by logistic regression, and
nearly identically match those selected for the other ANN models. Table 20 presents the
selected features for each model, ranked by order of significance (using p-value for
logistic regression, and reverse order of removal for ANN).

Table 20. Feature ranking for all models. (*Asterisk denotes a transformed feature)
Failure Prediction
Log. Reg.
ANN
PROT
PROT
NFTN
NFLOC
NFAF
NFTOT
NFTOT
NFAF
TEMP
NFP
MAN
NFTN
MAN

Damage Prediction
Log. Reg.
ANN
PROT
PROT
NFAF
NFLOC
NFTN*
NFAF
MAN
NFTOT
NFP
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Failure: Human vs. Mech Error
Log. Reg.
ANN
PROT
PROT
NFTOT
NFTOT
NFTN
NFAF
MINWIND
NFLOC
DSPLF*
NFP
NFAF
NFTN
MAN
TEMP

Model Comparison
There are some consistencies in the features selected by all models. Most
important, the variable PROT was the most significant to each model, for predicting both
failure and damage. Clearly the single greatest indicator of flight outcome is whether the
SUAS flown is a prototype model constructed by AFRL or a COTS model purchased
from a manufacturer.
NFAF is the only other variable to appear in every model. This means that
AFRL’s experience with a given airframe is important to predicting flight outcomes.
Likewise, NFTN and NFTOT appear in five of the six models, which suggests that they
are significant factors to investigate for failure prevention. MAN was the next most
important factor, appearing in four models, and is likewise worth noting for further
analysis and investigation.
The preponderance of factors that begin with “NF” (and the corresponding dearth
of terms beginning with “DS”) indicates the importance of experience over intervals in
determining SUAS flight outcomes. The “NF” factors record the total number of flights
for each measure, which is a good approximation for overall experience (NFTOT for
organizational experience, NFP for individual pilot experience and so forth). The “DS”
factors record the days since an event occurred, which marks the intervals between
events. These “DS” terms, with one exception, are surprisingly absent from this ranking.
The poor performance of the Damage Prediction Model (for both Logistic
Regression and Artificial Neural Networks) casts suspicion on the important factors it
suggests. If those two damage models are excluded from consideration, the remaining
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models for Failure Prediction suggest PROT, NFAF, NFTN, NFTOT, and MAN as the
most significant factors to address. Interestingly, some factors were favored by the
different model-building tools, with Logistic Regression using TEMP exclusively and
Artificial Neural Networks using NFLOC exclusively in both Failure models. These
variables may also warrant consideration, but are less likely to be of practical importance,
both from a physical perspective and from a modeling perspective.

Model Validation
The best-performing model, the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model, is
investigated for validity using 50 flights from the first quarter of calendar year 2010.
These data were not used in the construction of the model. Of the 50 flights, only 41 have
complete input data and failure outcomes. There were 5 flights terminating in failures
over this time period (12.2% failure rate), with three occurring on the same day, while
trying to accomplish the same highly complex, high-risk (in the opinion of the test
engineer) flight objective.
The model predicts 0 individual flight failures over the same period. See the
Confusion Matrix in Figure 29. NFTOT has a large influence at approximately 900
flights, producing an odds ratio of 𝒆−.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟏∗𝟗𝟎𝟎 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟎𝟐. The most likely type of flights

that can cause the model to predict failures at this high level of NFTOT are those with
prototype SUAS being flown manually. No flights with these characteristics were
attempted during this period. In order for the model to predict a failure for a COTS
aircraft, the SUAS has to be flown manually and must have an NFTN in excess of 57.
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This is unrealistic as Table 1 shows that the highest NFTN for the main dataset is 42.
Thus, the model will probably not predict failures for COTS aircraft with a large NFTOT.

Actual

Predicted
0
1
0

36

0

1

5

0

Figure 29. Confusion Matrix for Validation of Logistic Regression Failure Prediction
Model. Hit Rate = 87.8%.

Over this period, 83.0% of flights were COTS SUAS, compared to the 28.8%
historical average and 57.2% for the same quarter of the previous calendar year. This
indicates that the validation dataset does not reflect the typical composition of the
historical data, but indicates a trend away from testing prototype aircraft.
Of interesting note, the two failures not associated with the high-risk flight test
both occurred to COTS SUAS while under manual control. In both cases, the failure
prediction probability was elevated due to flying under manual control. In one case, the
particular SUAS had a large number of prior flights (NFTN = 38), which additionally
raised its predicted probability of a failure. This reinforces the validity of MAN as a
critical factor to be addressed for failure prevention, and suggests that NFTN may
likewise be important.
Further, the model predicts the probability of failure for each of the 41 flights.
Over the flights examined, the minimum probability of failure is 5.1%, the maximum is
41.5% and the median and mean are 10.2% and 13.7%, respectively. The model does not
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predict that any specific flights will be failures (no individual probability is greater than
50%). Since there are 41 flights where there are non-zero (and sometimes significant)
probabilities of failure, this suggests that the test engineer can expect a certain number of
flight failures.
Assume that a decision maker or test engineer can specify these 41 flights in
advance and wants to know the expected number of mishaps, given all the probabilities
across all flights. The Poisson-Binomial distribution is examined, which gives the
expected probability for a given number of failures occurring out of the 41 flights. In
general, the Poisson-Binomial is the convolution of 𝑛 independent, non-identical

Bernoulli trials (Wang 1993). Each flight represents a non-identical Bernoulli trial,
because it is a single trial with a unique probability of failure (assessed by the failure
prediction model). The outcome “failure” is substituted where the word “success” would
normally appear in the description of a Bernoulli trial, because “failure” is the outcome
that is positively predicted by the model. The Poisson-Binomial can be solved iteratively
using equations from Chen, Dempster and Liu (1994):

where

𝑅(𝑘, 𝐶) =

1 𝑘
Σ (−1)(𝑖+1) 𝑇(𝑖, 𝐶)𝑅(𝑘 − 𝑖, 𝐶)
𝑘 𝑖=1

𝑅(𝑘, 𝐶) is the probability of obtaining 𝑘 “failure” trials,

𝑅(𝑘 − 𝑖, 𝐶) is the probability (previously computed) of obtaining 𝑘 − 𝑖 “failure” trials,

and 𝑇(𝑖, 𝐶) is computed as shown:

𝑛
𝑇(𝑖, 𝐶) = Σ𝑗=1
𝑤𝑗𝑖 .

𝑛
𝑅(0, 𝐶) = Π𝑗=1
(1 − 𝜋𝑗 ) is the probability associated with zero “failure” trails,
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𝜋

𝑤𝑗 = �1−𝜋𝑗 � is the odds of a failure on flight j,
𝑗

and 𝜋𝑗 is the probability of “failure” on each flight 𝑗 out of 𝑛 total flights.

This iterative equation was implemented in MATLAB to compute the expected

number of failures for the 41 validation flights. The Poisson-Binomial distribution for
these flights (see Figure 30) shows that five failures is the largest of all the binomial
probabilities at 18.5%. Six failures and four failures are the next most likely, with 17.7%
and 15.5% probabilities, respectively.
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Figure 30. Poisson-binomial distribution for total number of failures given 41 flights
with individual flight probabilities determined by logistic regression failure model.

The logistic regression failure prediction model, while not predicting any
individual flight failures, nevertheless predicted (via the Poisson-Binomial distribution)
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that five failures was the most likely outcome of the 41 flights, a result that is exactly
validated by the dataset, in which five failures occurred. There is a wide range of
statistical validity with such a small validation set, though. The bounds of a two-tailed
90% confidence level include outcomes from three to nine failures, and the bounds of a
two-tailed 97% confidence level include outcomes from two to ten failures. Assuming a
97% confidence level, if the 41 flights result in two to ten total failures (inclusive), it will
not be rejected as statistically different from the Poisson-Binomial model. Since there
were five failures observed over these 41 flights, it can be concluded from these results
that there is not enough statistical evidence to reject the validity of this model for
predicting the expected total number of failures.

Model for Flight Planning
Using the results of the logistic regression modeling, a basic flight planning
model can be constructed that provides decision makers with an estimated minimum
number of flights to meet a given probability of success. The test engineers outline their
objectives, select the SUAS platform to complete it, select a pilot to fly the mission, and
collect all the necessary data as input for the logistic regression failure model. The output
from this model provides an estimate of the probability of a failure for the given set of
inputs. Assuming that failures result in complete data loss, this probability can be used to
compute the minimum expected number of flights necessary to reach a given probability
of overall mission success.
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Since the same platform, test site, flight crew, and other associated variables will
be used to achieve a specific flight objective on a given test day, the probability of an
SUAS failure is assumed to be constant for that mission on that day. This is not entirely
accurate, as each additional flight adds to NFTOT and NFAF (and NFTN if the same tail
number is recycled). But these variables affect the odds ratio so slightly (and NFAF and
NFTN work against one another) that the effect from flight to fight is small. In practice,
the probabilities of failure of sequential flights with the same SUAS typically vary by less
than 0.3% from flight-to-flight. Therefore, the output from the logistic regression failure
model is a good approximation for the probability of failure across all flights on a given
test day.
Let the failure probability, 𝜋, be the output of the logistic regression failure model

and let the minimum probability of mission success, 𝑝, be determined by the decision
maker or test authority. The minimum necessary number of flights flown, 𝑛, that are

expected to meet this minimum success level is related to these probabilities as shown:
1 − 𝜋 𝑛 ≥ 𝑝.

Given a minimum required probability of success and a probability of failure from the
logistic regression model, the minimum expected number of flights can be computed as
shown:
𝑛≥

ln(1 − 𝑝)
.
ln(𝜋)

This is equivalent to computing the number of trials necessary for the sum of all binomial
probabilities greater than zero to exceed probability 𝑝 given 𝜋.
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For example, assume that Flight #3 from Table 17 is specified by the test
engineers. The logistic regression failure model predicts a probability of failure of 0.484
or 48.4%. This flight would be classified as a “No Failure” flight, but it still has a fairly
high chance of failure. If a minimum probability of success of 90% was desired, the
minimum expected number of flights is:
𝑛≥

ln(1 − 0.90)
,
ln(0.484)

𝑛 ≥ 3.17,
𝑛 = 4.

This means that when the probability of each flight failing is 48.4%, the test
engineer can expect that all mission objectives will be achieved (all necessary flight data
collected) 90% of the time if at least four flights are attempted. If the minimum
probability of success is raised to 95%, the minimum number of flights is five.
Obviously, a 100% success rate is theoretically impossible.
This model, while simplistic, provides a good rule of thumb for the test engineer
to estimate the number of flights necessary to gather all the data. This model does suffer
from a few shortcomings, though. As discussed, it assumes that the probabilities for each
flight are constant, whereas they will vary slightly with the changes in NFTOT, NFAF,
and NFTN on each successive flight. Further, a flight failure does not necessarily mean
that all data is lost. If the failure occurs immediately upon takeoff, it is likely that all data
for the test will be lost. If the failure occurs midway through, it is possible that some data
could be salvaged, without having to be repeated by subsequent tests. To account for this,
the test engineer may find that a minimum probability of success set closer to 80% or
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lower works best, due to the partial gathering of data on each failure flight. Likewise, the
complexity of the mission objectives may affect the estimated number of flights: a
mission to see if a new launch capability performs correctly is a simple test whose result
is known if the SUAS takes off, whereas a series of climbs and glides to assess engine
and aerodynamic performance is more complex. The former may require a low
probability of success in order for the model to reflect empirical results, whereas the
latter may require a much higher probability. The occurrence of damage and its impact on
this flight planning model is not addressed, but would also affect the number of flights,
by possibly altering which aircraft could fly. If a damaged aircraft is replaced, the
probability of a failure from the logistic regression failure model could change
dramatically due to differences in NFAF (if a different model was selected for the
mission) and NFTN (if a different tail number of the same model was selected).
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V. Discussion

Summary
This research sought to determine if SUAS flight test failures and airframe
damage could be predicted from parameters measured prior to flight. A failure was
defined as a flight test terminating unexpectedly prior to all data being collected,
regardless of the cause of the termination. Damage was defined as any injury to the
airframe, regardless of cost or repair time. Both failures and damage were modeled with
logistic regression to determine the quantifiable effects of each important parameter, and
with artificial neural networks to provide an alternative method of parameter screening.
A review of the literature on large SUAS and manned aircraft mishaps (which are
comparable to a composite of SUAS “failures” and “damage”) suggested that human
error would be a leading cause of SUAS failures, and that increased pilot experience and
currency would help reduce those failure rates. In the course of analysis, human error was
found to be equally as prevalent as mechanical error, while pilot experience and currency
were not found to significantly affect failure rates. Likewise, surface wind speed was
hypothesized to affect failure rates, but this parameter, too, was not found to significantly
affect observed failure rates. The one area where large UAS and manned aircraft results
overlapped with the SUAS results obtained in this research is in the effect of experience.
Mishap rates tend to decrease in the manned and large UAS communities over time as
more flight hours are built up and as organizations adapt. So, too, did SUAS failure rates
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decrease, both with total number of flights across all platforms, as well as with total
flights for each type of airframe.
The overall results of the logistic regression analysis were that damage could not
be accurately predicted, but failures could be. The neural network analysis confirmed that
the measured parameters modeled damage no better than random noise. For failure
modeling, the five main parameters deemed important by the logistic regression and the
artificial neural network modeling merited further investigation for failure prevention.
The models developed from this data were not all equally useful. Most noticeably,
the damage prediction models performed poorly as classifiers. This means that SUAS
damage is not possible to predict with any greater accuracy than simple guessing, given
the measured variables that were available. Damage appears to be a random outcome,
with no discernible root causes. The primary conclusion regarding damage is that it
occurs in about 23% of flights, with no clear preventive measures available.
Discriminating between human-caused and mechanical-caused failures shows some
promise, but the significant factors identified by the two modeling approaches were
dissimilar and the prediction hit rates were weak.
The simple outcomes of “failure” and “no failure”, on the other hand, tend to be
more predictable. There are common features that are correlated with the occurrence of
SUAS failures that can be exploited to minimize future mishap rates. Two dichotomous
variables, PROT (which indicated whether an SUAS was a lab-developed prototype or a
Commercial-off-the-Shelf aircraft) and MAN (which indicated whether an SUAS was
flown manually or with autopilot control) were significant in predicting failures. From
the analysis, it can be concluded that, controlling for all other significant factors, flying a
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prototype SUAS increases the odds of a failure by a factor of six over a COTS aircraft.
Additionally, controlling for all other significant factors, flying an SUAS manually rather
than by autopilot control increases the odds of a failure by a factor of two. The more
flights the organization has in total, and the more flights on a given type of airframe, the
lower the failure rate. More flights on a given tail number increases the risk of a failure.
The results of this research were obtained from data gathered on small, unmanned
aerial systems with wingspans between 20 inches and 11 feet and takeoff weights under
100 pounds. Twenty nine unique airframes (with a total of 103 different tail numbers),
including a mix of lab-designed prototypes and COTS models were aggregated for this
analysis. All data were obtained in a research environment where prototype SUAS are
frequently developed and more traditional, COTS SUAS are flown in new ways and with
novel objectives, payloads, and technologies. Thus, the results of this research are
applicable primarily to experimental vehicles and in a research and development
environment. This is not to say that the lessons learned must not be applied to other
systems or operational environments, but merely that one should exercise caution and be
fully aware of the underlying assumptions of this research before applying its conclusions
to other scenarios.

Recommendations
The recommendations from these results are fairly straightforward. One simple
way to decrease the odds of a failure is to substitute a COTS SUAS for a prototype SUAS
whenever possible. This should be done especially when flying high value payloads or
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mission-critical objectives. Alternately, (and much more complexly) the prototype
aircraft could be brought up to COTS levels of reliability. However, given that AFRL is
primarily tasked with pushing the technological boundaries and then transferring the
technology to other organizations or private industry to be refined, this second option is
outside the normal scope of operations and is almost certainly not cost effective.
The preference for autonomous flight over manual flight to reduce failure rates is
not necessarily intuitive but makes sense in light of the remarkable differences in sensory
environment that SUAS exhibit versus manned aircraft. The possibilities for perceptual
errors have been well-established for large UAS. It appears that autonomous control of
SUAS significantly reduces failures that would have otherwise occurred with manual
flight.
Less significant, but still important is the role of experience in failure prevention.
Greater organizational experience, expressed as the increase in total number of flights
across all platforms, reduces failures. Greater organizational experience with a given type
of airframe similarly reduces failure rates. These results were largely expected, but are
nonspecific given the quality of the data. The term “experience” is not merely a measure
of AFRL’s proficiency with the mechanics of SUAS flight tests and knowledge of the
peculiarities specific to each airframe. Rather, this broad term incorporates all
organizational knowledge and improvements made to SUAS operations and airframes
without identifying the specific improvements that reduced the failure rates. AFRL
continually adds additional features to its flight planning and operations and iterates on
SUAS designs to great overall effect. The result has been a statistically significant
decrease in failure rates over time, which can be captured in this concept of
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organizational experience. However, the specific improvements that have had greatest
effect (or those hypothesized improvements which have actually worsened failure rates)
cannot be determined with precision from the data. Thus, while increased organizational
experience with flight testing and on each airframe is likely to continue to lower failure
rates, the efficacy of specific actions and policy decisions have not been assessed in the
research, except to the extent that they influence other variables.
One such case of this influence is with pilot currency. While AFRL was not
required to meet mandatory pilot currency requirements for the period covered by this
data, future regulations will incorporate requirements mandating that SUAS pilots have a
minimum number of flights over a set time period, in order to remain “current”. The
results of this research indicate that pilot currency is not statistically significant in the
model of SUAS failures. Coupled with the results on the benefits of autonomous flight
over manual flight, it appears that resources would be best spent to ensure that the
autopilot settings are correct rather than that pilots have recently flown. The elimination
of a pilot currency requirement, while not impacting failure rates, would also save
valuable range testing time that can be used for higher priority flight experiments.
Many recent AFRL flight experiment test plans have imposed maximum surface
wind requirements (which were not in place while this data was being collected) that can
cause test delays or cancellations. This research demonstrated that the maximum surface
winds at the test site were statistically insignificant in the model of SUAS failures.
Likewise, other environmental factors such as time of day, temperature, and location had
no statistical impact on failure rates. Thus, there is not enough evidence to conclude that
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any of these measured environmental factors impact SUAS failure rates either positively
or negatively.
Flight failures have historically occurred in 38.5% of all AFRL/RWWV SUAS
flight experiments. An understanding of this failure rate may help decision makers, range
safety officers and test engineers with expectation management. While this research has
outlined some positive steps AFRL can take to lower mishap rates, it has also identified
areas that show little promise at improving the rates in the hopes that preventive measures
are only undertaken which are statistically justifiable and whose benefits are
appropriately balanced with costs. There are a few additional measures that can be taken
that may assist future analysts and engineers identify means to further lower SUAS
failure rates.
Root causes of failures should be analyzed from an engineering perspective and
tracked to identify trends. This could be as simple as one or two lines added to every
flight report and one or more categories assigned to the outcome of each flight in a
database, much like the error codes of the DoD HFACS taxonomy. This simple addition
will enable a future analyst to quickly identify failure or damage trends without resorting
to guesswork or memory to recall the root causes. Additionally, if any other factors that
were not included in this research are deemed important for possible failure prediction
and prevention (such as percent of maximum takeoff weight used, ground station
operator experience, or mission type as a categorical variable), they should be recorded in
the flight reports.
Tracking each tail number individually would help to identify trends in aircraft
disposal for reliability estimates. Each tail number was not tracked precisely over the five
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years covered by this data set. We do not know with certainty from the data where each
tail number went: whether it was scrapped when a program ended, disposed of following
a crash, upgraded into a newer airframe model, demolished in destructive lab testing, or
sent away to be a desk model or display aircraft. By tracking the outcomes of flight
testing on each airframe, reliability estimates may be made that can shed light on how
many flights an airframe can be expected to have before being disposed, or what the
mean time between failures is for a tail number.
Lastly, organizational experience has a positive impact on failure rates, but there
were insufficient data to determine with specificity which changes were beneficial and
which were detrimental. Over the period measured, the net result was improvement in
failure rates, but there is no way to identify and quantify the most cost-effective
improvements. A record of policy decisions, major design alterations, or major process
changes should be noted on flight reports to provide a time stamp for future analysis. This
future analysis should seek to determine whether the policy, design, or process changes
have been effective in lowering failure rates, predicting damage rates, or generally
improving the cost-effectiveness of operations.

Areas for Future Research
Ordinarily, a designed experiment is recommended to better screen important
features and to optimize SUAS failure rates. Unfortunately, no designed experiment is
possible in this case. This is due to the unique nature of the data; only a handful of
parameters can be adjusted to specific factor levels, while most cannot. The surface wind
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speed can be measured but not controlled. Test times, days and locations are typically
awarded on a priority-based system, with no guarantees of dates, times or locations.
Number of total flights can never be lowered, and can only be raised incrementally. The
same is true of the other counting variables. Each airframe has a given number of flights
in its history and can only gain them at the cost of adding an additional airframe flight, an
additional organizational flight, and an additional pilot flight, while at the same time
resetting all the days since last flight, days since last mission, days since pilot’s last flight
and similar interval measures. While techniques like analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
could be used to account for the influence of uncontrollable factors, the interconnected
nature of the flights precludes a randomized, designed experiment on the full complement
of parameters.
Any effects of selection bias should be investigated. The results of this research
describe significant correlations that were found in the data, but these correlations do not
necessarily imply causation. For example, the logistic regression failure model found that
as the number of flights on a tail number increases, its odds of a failure increase. This
does not necessarily mean that tail numbers should be scrapped after a few flights to
lower their risk of failure. It could mean that older aircraft are intentionally selected for
riskier flight experiments – nothing in the data is able to identify if that hypothesized
action is occurring. Likewise, the fact that wind speed did not affect failure rates should
not be read as an encouragement to fly in adverse weather conditions. It could be that
only missions with higher-likelihoods of success (as determined by the test engineer)
were selected for known windy days, or that other tests were intentionally scrapped
despite the lack of maximum wind regulations at the time. These examples highlight how
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selection bias could influence the results and should be investigated to better characterize
the effectiveness of potential interventions.

Contributions of this Research
•

The first published study of SUAS failure and damage rates, this research
quantified the risk of data loss associated with SUAS flight test failures and the
probability of damage incurred during flight testing.

•

Analyzed 20 measurable parameters and identified both statistically significant
and insignificant factors that affected SUAS failure rates.

•

Developed and validated a logistic regression model to predict the probability of a
flight failure and to quantify the increased or decreased risk associated with
alternate flight test configurations.

•

Developed a model to predict the minimum number of SUAS flights necessary to
achieve any specified level of expected mission success.

•

Proposed targeted and statistically justifiable failure prevention techniques to be
implemented by test engineers and decision makers to reduce the risk of data loss
associated with SUAS flight testing.
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